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Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or
“pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known,
if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for
such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts
central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept,
that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational con-
tent of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity
for apperception, but on the actual intellectual awareness of oneself in
such apperception. I then defend this interpretation from a variety of
objections.
[An] object can only be represented in accordance with its
relations and is nothing other than the subjective representation
of the subject itself, but made general, for I am the original of all
objects.
R4674, Duisburg Nachlaß 17:646 (1773–5)
Immanuel Kant
1. Introduction
The Delphic oracle advises, “Know thyself.” This injunctiontakes on special urgency in the Modern period. As is well known,
several notable figures, including Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz, con-
strue self-knowledge as, at least in some ways, prior to knowledge of
nature.
Kant is famous for proclaiming a “Copernican revolution” accord-
ing to which “we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves
have put into them” (Bxviii). This Copernican turn requires a perhaps
startling emphasis on the role of the subject in constituting “that order
and regularity in [appearances] that we call nature”, an order put there
by the “nature of our mind” (A125; see also B165).
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It is clear that one intended element of the Copernican turn consists
in showing that the principles constituting the order and regularity
of nature are (or are derived from) those “pure” (i.e. non-empirical)
concepts of the understanding that Kant calls the “categories”.
Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appear-
ances, thus to nature as the sum total of all appearances (natura
materialiter spectata) ... all appearances of nature, as far as their
combination is concerned, stand under the categories, on which
nature (considered merely as nature in general) depends, as the
original ground of its necessary lawfulness (as natura formaliter
spectata) (B163–5)
The categories are both the most fundamental concepts constituting
the content of thought — by virtue of being the fundamental concepts
of an object in general (A290/B346) — and the basis for the objective
principles governing the entirety of phenomenal nature.
One might then think that the articulation of the fundamental prin-
ciples of nature in terms of features of the finite rational (human) mind
constitutes the entirety of Kant’s idealism concerning the subjective
contribution knowledge of nature. While this is certainly part of Kant’s
view, he implicates subjectivity in the constitution of nature even more
tightly than the above would suggest, for he holds that the categories
themselves depend on a further element — viz. a rational being’s ca-
pacity for self-conscious awareness of its own activity in thinking. Kant
calls this form of self-consciousness the “pure apperception” (B132).
In two arresting remarks from the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
states the dependence of the categories on pure apperception. First,
in the “A” edition of the Paralogisms section of the first Critique, Kant
claims, “Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the cat-
egories” such that the “thinking I (the soul) ... cognizes the categories,
and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception,
and hence cognizes them through itself” (Observation on the sum of
the pure doctrine of the soul, A401–2, original emphasis). Second, in
the revised “B” edition of the first Critique, Kant argues in Transcen-
dental Deduction that the principles of “the objective determination
of all representations [i.e., the categories] ... are all derived [abgeleitet]
from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception” (Tran-
scendental Deduction §19, B142).1
Kant’s remarks concerning the role of self-consciousness in ground-
ing the possibility of the categories, and thus knowledge of nature,
are perplexing. It is not clear what he means in saying that the cate-
gories are “derived” from apperception, nor is it clear why appercep-
tion would “ground the possibility” of the categories. In what follows,
I explicate one way in which pure apperception plays a crucial role for
Kant in explaining the possibility of the categories by discussing one
category in particular — viz. <substance>.2 I focus on <substance>
both because it is, as Kant is reported to have said, the “most pre-
eminent” of the categories and “thus the basis of all other cognition”
(Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:769–70), and because of the way it figures in
the historical context of debate concerning the origin of the content of
central metaphysical concepts. I argue that Kant must appeal to pure
apperception as the only possible source of the content of the concept
<substance>, in so far as he understands this concept to have any-
thing more than purely logical or grammatical significance.
With respect to the category <substance>, Kant distinguishes be-
tween the logical/grammatical notion of a concept’s always taking the
subject place in a categorical judgment (e.g., B149, B186, B288) — what
1 Kant does not typically refer to the categories themselves as “principles”,
though he does of course think that the principles of objective representa-
tion discussed in the Analytic of Principles section are derived from the
categories. Kant may thus be simply obliquely referring to the categories
themselves by appealing to the principles and their “derivation” from ap-
perception. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging clarity on this
point.
2 Concepts are designated using pointy brackets. I shall use ‘categorial’ in
discussion of the categories and ‘categorical’ for discussion of judgments
which take strict subject-predicate logical form. For brevity’s sake I speak of
the category <substance>, but Kant typically characterizes the category
as that of <subsistence-inherence> (e.g., A80/B106). For my purposes
these can be treated interchangeably.
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I shall call a ‘<substance>L’, from the “schematized” or temporal
conception of a substance as a permanent being (A144/B183) — what
I shall call a ‘<substance>S’. However, between these two notions
lies the conception of a substance purely as a metaphysical subject,
as that in which a property (specifically, an “accident”) inheres — a
‘<substance>M’. For example, in his discussion of substance in the
First Analogy, Kant says,
The determinations of a substance that are nothing other than
particular ways for it to exist are called accidents. They are
always real, since they concern the existence of the substance
(negations are merely determinations that express the non-being
of something in the substance). Now if one ascribes a particular
existence to this real in substance (e.g., motion, as an accident
of matter), then this existence is called “inherence,” in contrast
to the existence of the substance, which is called “subsistence.”
(A186-7/B229-30)
This notion of a substance as that in which accidents inhere is neces-
sary for Kant to carry out his account of the possibility of a science
of nature, but it cannot be analytically derived from the purely logical
conception of a term that is always in the subject position and never
in the predicate, and it is presupposed by Kant’s conception of a per-
manent substratum. I argue that pure apperception is thus the only
possible source for the content of <substance>M.3
In the next section, I explicate the metaphysical conception of a sub-
stance. I also indicate its role in the broadly Aristotelian conception of
a science of nature Kant shares with other figures in the Modern pe-
riod. Finally, I raise a problem for understanding the origin of the con-
tent of the metaphysical conception of substance I call “the problem
3 Note that I’m primarily concered with the source of the representa-
tional content, not the justification for applying the concept. Moreover, in
what follows, when I discuss apperception as the source of the concept
<substance>, unless otherwise indicated I mean in particular the concept
<substance>M.
of the subject”. Section three examines the details of Kant’s view of
<substance>. I examine what I take to be the primary alternative ac-
count for explaining the source of the content of the categories and of
<substance> in particular. This is what I call the “logicist” interpreta-
tion championed by (among others) Béatrice Longuenesse and Stephen
Engstrom. I argue that logicism cannot provide the needed explanation
of the content of <substance>M, nor is it needed to explain how an
appeal to apperception, in deriving the content of the categories, is
compatible with the project of the Metaphysical Deduction. I then pro-
vide a positive “actualist” account of the nature of apperception and its
role in provisioning the content of our concept <substance>M, after
which I discuss, in section four, a variety of objections that arise con-
cerning the way in which the proposed interpretation integrates with
other aspects of Kant’s mature critical theory of cognition. Finally, in
section five, I summarize and conclude the paper. I thus argue that,
according to Kant, the self-conscious “I” is the original basis for all
scientific knowledge of nature by virtue of being the source of our
metaphysical conception of a substance.
2. Conceiving of Substance
We can better understand Kant’s position on self-consciousness, the
categories, and their joint significance for achieving a science of na-
ture, by focusing on a particular Leibnizian strain of thought concern-
ing the connection between self-consciousness and the acquisition of
concepts central for metaphysical theorizing, including the concept
<substance>. To that end, this section divides into two parts. First,
I discuss in greater detail the conception of a substance as it connects
with metaphysical theorizing in the Modern period. I then discuss a
view, widely held in the Modern period, objecting to the legitimacy of
this conception of substance. In the second subsection, I discuss Leib-
niz’s solution to this problem, and set up a framework for discussing
Kant’s solution to the issue in the critical period.
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2.1 Substance & the Problem of the Subject
The basic notion of a metaphysical subject, or “substance”, is of that in
which properties inhere. Substances thus substand, and they also sub-
sist, or exist independently of other things. Though Modern philoso-
phers were not always entirely clear as to how to explain this notion of
“independence”, there is a straightforward way of connecting the con-
ception of the subsistence of a thing to the notion of its substanding, in
the sense that subsisting things do not exist by virtue of their inherence
in anything else. A substanding thing may well be causally dependent
on another substance, but it does not inhere in any other thing.
Hence, if a substanding thing subsists, in the sense that it does not
itself inhere in anything else, then substances are loci of explanation
insofar as they constitute the termini of questions concerning the in-
stantiation of properties. Non-substantial beings, such as properties or
events, might stand in as loci of explanation in limited cases. For ex-
ample, one might say of a fight that it is vicious, or of a rainbow that
it is beautiful. Similarly, one might hope of justice that it is blind. But
the fight and the rainbow are adjectival on the beings that constitute
them (respectively, the fighters and the raindrops), while talk of the
blindness of justice, if we are to avoid reifying the property, is purely
metaphorical. Hence, substance plays its explanatory role because the
inherence relation that a property has to the substance which has it is
a kind of asymmetric dependence relation that the substance does not
stand in to anything else.4
Proper or scientific knowledge of nature requires, in the broadly
Aristotelian tradition within which Kant is enmeshed, knowledge of
why things are the way that they are.5 Because properties depend
asymmetrically on the substances that have them, the study of sub-
stance explains the instantiation of one property or pattern of proper-
4 For discussion of several of these points, see (Langton 1998, ch. 3).
5 This is true even of philosophers, such as Descartes, Locke, and Newton,
who might otherwise reject “scholastic” ways. For discussion, see (De Jong
and Betti 2010; De Jong 2010; Pasnau 2014).
ties rather than another. Hence, on this conception of proper science,
the object of proper scientific study is substance. Such knowledge, in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was typically regarded as a
priori, not (or not just) because (as in our contemporary usage of ‘a
priori’) it is knowable independently of experience, but rather because
a priori knowledge is knowledge why or from what ground some fact
obtains. For members of this tradition, experience can at best provide a
posteriori knowledge of what is the case. For example, experience only
speaks of the instantiation of some determinate property. It cannot tell
one why it is the case that the property is instantiated.6
If one were sympathetic to content empiricism, where the content of
all possible thought must ultimately be traceable to sense impressions,
then one might object that the concept <substance>, as described, is
empty. It was widely taken for granted that sense impressions could
not present final subjects of inherence.7 Indeed, it is not clear that sense
impressions can even present an inherence relation. Perhaps the senses
present only particulars.8 This “problem of the subject”, as I will call
it, thus generates a prima facie challenge to any account for how we
come by the legitimate thought content of a substance as a subsisting
and substanding being.9
6 A priori knowability in this sense of knowledge of that in virtue of which
something is the case, and not merely that it is the case, was widely held in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to be the epistemic ideal towards
which all doxastic states aim; see (Pasnau 2014) for discussion; see also (Ar-
nauld and Nicole 1683, 233; Adams 1994, 109; Smit 2009; Hogan 2009, 53–4).
7 See, e.g., (Locke 1970, 546 (ECHU IV.iii.14)); (Boyle 1991, 13); (Kant ID, 2:393);
(Herz 1771, 123).
8 Newton, for example, was in fact rather famously skeptical that we could
have any knowledge of substance at all. See, e.g., his remarks in the General
Scholium in the Principia (Newton 2004, 91).
9 Of course, this is a problem only if the senses are our sole means of access
to reality. As we will see, Descartes, Leibniz, and the pre-critical Kant all
deny this. For discussion of this problem, referred to as the “objection from
perception”, see (Broackes 2006, 158).
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2.2 The Leibnizian Reply
Leibniz provides one well-known account of the a priori source of our
concept of a substance and its properties.10 Leibniz argues that it is
via introspection or “reflection” on one’s self and one’s causal powers
that one first grasps the concept of a substance. Leibniz develops this
view in notes constituting his initial reply (1698) to Locke’s objections
concerning innate ideas, arguing that reflection is a form of awareness
of not only mental activity or states, but of the mind itself.11
It is very true that our perceptions of ideas come either from
the external senses or from the internal sense, which one may
call reflection; but this reflection does not limit itself solely to
the operations of the mind [esprit], as is said [in Locke’s ECHU
II.1.4]; it extends to the mind itself, and it is in apperceiving
[s’appercevant] it that we apperceive [appercevons] substance.12
10 Descartes is another obvious proponent of the importance of self-knowledge
for knowledge of nature. For Descartes, all knowledge of substance is purely
intellectual, as is indicated by his famous “wax argument” in the Second
Meditation. As he puts it, “when I distinguish the wax from its outward
forms — take the clothes off, as it were, and consider it naked” (CSM II:22;
AT VII:32) then what is grasped purely intellectually is the nature of the
wax as an enduring thing with determinable features (consisting of being
extended, flexible, and changeable (CSM II:20; AT VII:31)), and possessing
a particular modal profile (of taking on “countless” possible forms (CSM
II:21; AT VII:31)). Descartes argues that “the perception I have of it [the
wax] is a case not of vision or touch or imagination — nor has it ever been,
despite previous appearances — but of purely mental scrutiny” (CSMII:21;
AT VII:31). He also says in the Third Meditation that, “[m]y understanding
of what a thing is, what truth is, and what thought is, seems to derive
simply from my own nature” (CSMII:26; AT VII:38). For further discussion
along these lines, see (Pasnau 2013, 139). For objections to this reading, see
(Williams 2005/1978, 220–1); (Carriero 2009, 440, note 32); cf. (Morris 2014).
11 Leibniz articulated these replies in a letter to Thomas Burnett, a frequent cor-
respondent of Leibniz’s and a friend to Locke. Leibniz attempted to engage
Locke via Burnett several times, with no success. For further discussion of
the history of this particular aspect of Leibniz’s correspondence with Bur-
nett, see Gerhardt’s discussion translated in (Leibniz 1916, 5–7).
12 (Leibniz 1978, 5:23–4).
Leibniz repeats this conception of reflection’s role in the generation
of the concept <substance> in other work, and extends the view to
include other central metaphysical concepts. Commenting on Locke’s
theory concerning the origin of all of our ideas in his New Essays on
Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz says:
Now, reflection is nothing other than attention to what is within
us, and the senses do not give us what we already bring with
us. Given this, can anyone deny that there is a great deal in-
nate in our mind, since we are innate to ourselves, so to speak,
and since we have within ourselves being, unity, substance, dura-
tion, change, action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other
objects of our intellectual ideas?13
Since reflection is simply “attention to what is within us”, and we
are, as Leibniz jokingly puts it, “innate to ourselves”, all relevant ideas
(concepts) of a substantial subject are gained by reflection on ourselves.
According to Leibniz, the content of such concepts originates in the
contemplation — reflection — of our own nature. If we could not so
reflect on our own nature, we would never even be able to conceive
of the substance-accident relation.14 In the Monadology Leibniz further
emphasizes this position, arguing that
it is thus, as we think of ourselves, that we think of being, of
substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial,
and of God himself, conceiving of that which is limited in us
as being without limits in him. These reflective acts provide us
13 (Leibniz 1996, 294).
14 The details of Leibniz’s view are contested and require more discussion than
I can provide here. See (Anderson 1981; Jolley 1988, 1990, ch. 10; McRae 1972,
1995; Perkins 1999) for discussion. For our purposes it is enough to note that
Leibniz construes reflection, however it is ultimately to be understood, as
the sole source for the concepts necessary for metaphysics, and specifically
the concept <substance>. It is this view that I argue Kant takes up and
develops.
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with the principal objects of our reasonings (Leibniz 1969, 645–6,
§30).
In these passages I take Leibniz to make two claims. First, the meta-
physical knowledge that we have of nature as a plurality of substantial
beings depends on, and is posterior to, our epistemic grasp of ourselves
as substantial beings. Second, the priority of self-knowledge to our un-
derstanding of nature comes from the role the self plays as a source of
the content of our ideas (or concepts).
In arguing that the self is a privileged source of representational
content, Leibniz endorses what we may call the “Difference Thesis” re-
garding introspection.15 Introspection provides a privileged and pecu-
liar sort of epistemic access to ourselves.16 Introspection is privileged
because it provides a better route to self-knowledge than, e.g., exter-
nal perception or testimony. It is peculiar because it is a special way
of getting self-knowledge, wholly different from perception or testi-
mony. This view of self-knowledge, coupled with claims concerning
what the self is — viz. a simple unitary substance — provides a ba-
sis for a Leibnizian resolution to the problem of the subject. It is on
the basis of this privileged and peculiar access that we each have to
ourselves that we enjoy our capacity to represent (i.e., have an idea of,
conceive of) anything external to (i.e., distinct from) us as a substantial
thing. Given that representation of substance (or the capacity thereto)
15 For discussion of the Difference Thesis in contemporary philosophizing
about self-knowledge, see (Gertler 2011, 10–12) and (Smithies and Stoljar
2012, 4–6). The Difference Thesis is not trivial. Philosophers sympathetic to
empiricism can plausibly deny it, as they construe introspection as a form
of perceptual access, and thus in principle no different from perception of
external objects. Locke and Hume plausibly deny the Difference Thesis in
favor of conceiving of introspection merely as internal perception. More con-
temporary figures who, for a variety of reasons, deny the Difference Thesis
include (Armstrong 1968; Dretske 1994; Byrne 2005; Goldman 2006, ch. 9;
Schwitzgebel 2012).
16 For discussion of these features of introspection, see (Byrne 2005). As Byrne
notes, they can come apart, with accounts of self-knowledge allowing that
introspection is privileged even if not peculiar; see, e.g., (Ryle 2009, 160).
is a condition of knowledge of substance, rejecting the Difference The-
sis would thus, according to Leibniz, be tantamount to rejecting the
possibility of knowledge, and even conception, of substantial nature
altogether.
Let me lay out the various claims a bit more explicitly. Leibniz con-
ceives of reflection as marking a privileged relation to ourselves differ-
ent from that to any other object. This is the “Difference Thesis”.
Difference Thesis: Introspection (specifically, self-conscious reflec-
tion) provides a privileged and peculiar relation to oneself as subject,
and is in this way epistemically distinctive.
The Difference Thesis underwrites the role of self-consciousness in
metaphysical theorizing. This is spelled out in the “Source” and “Pri-
ority” theses.
Source Thesis: The content of self-consciousness is the source of the
content of at least some of the concepts central for engaging in meta-
physical speculation, such as <substance>, <being>, <unity>,
etc.
Priority Thesis: Self-consciousness is prior to, and necessary for, meta-
physical knowledge of substances and at least some of their prop-
erties.
Thus, Leibniz’s conception of how we can come to have knowledge of
substantial beings depends in part on his account of how we can even
come to think or represent such beings, which he articulates via his
notion of “reflection”. While it is certainly worth considering whether
this strategy of explaining the source of concepts like <substance>
in the special nature of self-conscious awareness (“reflection”) could
ever be successful, my interest here is in the question of whether we
can see this strategy in Kant’s work.
During the 1770s Kant at times seems to be pursuing a version of
this Leibnizian strategy. For example, in a 1769 note on Baumgarten’s
Metaphysica, he says that
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by means of our senses only the relations of things can be re-
vealed, and we can represent the absolute or the subject only
from our selves. The idea of substance actually comes from the
repraesentatione sui ipsius [representation of oneself], insofar as
we represent that something is separate from us (R3921, 17:346;
see also R4493, 17:571–2; R5290, 18:144; R5297, 18:146)17
The lecture texts we have from the 1770s, as well as various notes,
also suggest that Kant holds that we represent ourselves in a special or
unique manner. For example, in lectures shortly after the Dissertation
Kant says, “We have no intuition in the whole world except the intu-
ition of our self; all other things are appearances” (Anthropologie Collins
25:15 (1772–3)). Kant’s point here is not that we have only one intuition
— viz. of ourselves. Rather, it is that all of our outer intuitions are of
non-substantial appearances, while our inner (though non-intellectual)
intuitions present ourselves as substantial subjects. In a reflexion also
from the early-to-mid 1770s, Kant says, “The I is the intuition of a
substance” (R4493, 17:571 (1772–5)). Similarly, in the Metaphysics L1 lec-
tures, from roughly the same period, Kant contrasts consciousness of
external objects with consciousness of the self. One intuits oneself im-
mediately, but the same is not true of external objects (28:206–7, 224).
The self so intuited (as intelligence) is substantial, simple, and immate-
rial (28:224–5).
In the quote that forms the epigraph to the present paper — R4674,
from the Duisberg Nachlass of 1775–6 — Kant writes of the “I” as the
“original of all objects”. And, as he does in the lecture material cited
above, Kant contrasts the special access we have to ourselves with our
access via intuition to external objects. The intuition of oneself is of an
object whose properties are not presented, as outer things are, merely
in terms of relations.18 The language Kant uses in R4674 is also echoed
17 For related discussion see (Laywine 2005, 8–9).
18 There is also indication in the Duisburg NachlaSS, as there was in Kant’s lec-
tures, of his endorsement of the rational psychology he would later come
in other texts from the mid-1770s, For example, Kant states that the
“I” is the “original concept” of substance which we “borrow” for use
in our conception of other substances (Metaphysics L1, 28:225–6). Re-
latedly, he remarks that “the I expresses the substantial; for that sub-
strate in which all accidents inhere is the substantial. This is the only
case where we can immediately intuit the substance” (Pölitz Metaphysik
28:226 (1777–80)).
Thus, Kant’s view in the 1770s at least suggests endorsement of the
Difference Thesis, and with it the Priority and Source theses, though
full substantiation of these claims requires more discussion than I can
provide here.19 However, one might think that even if Kant accepts
such claims prior to the publication of the first Critique, he thoroughly
rejects the Leibnizian strategy for resolving the problem of the subject
in the “critical” period of 1781 and later. In the next section I argue that
this is not so.
3. Kant on Substance
In this section I examine Kant’s rejection of any derivation of the cat-
egory <substance> from intuition (and from the contents of sense
more broadly), discuss possible readings of his positive view — in
particular what I call the “logicist” interpretation — and defend my
preferred “actualist” one.
3.1 Sensibility & the Problem of the Subject
In the critical period, Kant is clear as to what cannot be given via sensi-
bility. For example, he says that “a manifold’s combination (Verbindung)
to criticize. For example, in the NachlaSS, Kant says “I would not represent
anything as outside of me and thus make appearance into experience (ob-
jectively) if the representations did not relate to something that is parallel to
my I, through which I refer them from myself to another subject” (R4675,
17:648 (1775); my emphasis). For discussion, see (Guyer 1987; Carl 1989b,
1989a; Serck-Hanssen 2001; Laywine 2005, 2006; Kitcher 2011).
19 See (Allison 2015, 58–9ff) for some supporting discussion of Kant’s endorse-
ment of Leibniz’s general strategy.
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as such can never come to us through the senses” (B129). One im-
portant form of combination is predication. Its categorial counterpart
is subsistence-inherence.20 If we take seriously Kant’s clear statement
that the senses cannot combine anything, then we cannot construe
the senses as representing anything by predicating features of objects.21
Predication occurs only in judgment, or in the synthesis of perceptions
with the “dynamical” categories in experience. Hence, the senses alone
cannot represent (or present to consciousness) anything as predicated
of anything, and correspondingly, of any quality as inhering in any-
thing.22
Consider the sensory grasp of the particular redness of a particular
rose, in contrast with the conceptual grasp of a particular rose as red.
One can apprehend the redness of the particular rose without thereby
apprehending that the rose is red.23 In apprehending this bit of the
rose’s redness, one is representing a particular portion of space and a
20 I leave open exactly how we should understand the notion of “counterpart”
here. At the least, Kant intends the relation between logical subject and
predicate to prove an epistemological guide to our conception of a substance.
But he may intend more than this, depending on the reading of the project
of the Metaphysical Deduction that one endorses. I discuss this issue in
further detail below.
21 It is important to note here that the claim is that no predication occurs in
intuition, not that no predication occurs in experience. This is one reason
for thinking that Kant cannot hold a view of intuition according to which
it intrinsically possesses a “content”, understood in terms of a correctness
condition. In contemporary terms, this means that Kant cannot hold that
the “Content View” is true of intuition. For discussion of the Content View,
see (Siegel 2010, 2011) and (Schellenberg 2011). For critical discussion of
the view as it relates to Kant’s conception of intuition, see (McLear 2016a,
2016b).
22 Kant’s position on this matter is also clear from his statement that the dy-
namical categories (relation and modality) apply necessarily only to experi-
ence and not unconditionally to intuition. The mathematical categories (of
extensive and intensive magnitude) are the only categories that apply “apo-
dictically” to intuition (A160–1/B199–200; see also A178–80/B220–3).
23 This way of construing intuition sits well with a conception of intuitions as
relating to tropes. For defense of this view, see (Smit 2000) and (Grüne 2009,
65–71).
particular property filling or bounding that space. In this way, intuition
offers only the awareness of spatially and temporally grouped proper-
ties without any further representation of their underlying “unity” (as
Kant would say) in a particular object.24
The point about predication and inherence being absent in intuition
is a wholly general claim, and holds of inner sense just as of outer.
In general, intuition does not say anything “of” anything. It simply
presents elements of the subject’s environment or itself (i.e., of what
can interact with the subject’s receptive sensible powers in outer or
inner sense), and Kant takes sensory intuition to present properties
or states, not the subjects thereof.25 These include (for us) such things
as shape, hardness, location, color, and so forth. These are features of
objects, and being aware of them allows a subject to be cognitively
connected (de re) to the objects in which the features inhere. However,
such a cognitive connection does not amount to a representation that
presents an object as having the relevant feature, or as the feature’s
itself inhering in an object.
3.2 The Importance of Pure Apperception
At least by the publication of the first Critique, Kant denies that we can
have anything like a privileged intuition of a substantial self, and so de-
24 One might object here that these considerations show at best that there is
no de dicto awareness of a subject. But perhaps there is de re awareness.
Insofar as intuition allows for the tracking and responsive differential dis-
crimination of objects then this might count as a form of de re awareness;
cf. (McLear 2015, 104–5 and note 60). But there is no further sense in which
the awareness of sensory qualities in intuition extends to a sensory aware-
ness of the metaphysical subject of those qualities, else the objections con-
sidered above would hold. There is also the issue of whether there can be
de re representation of phenomena independent of any activity of synthe-
sis on the subject’s part. Such a position would require discussion of the
ontology of Kant’s transcendental idealism, which goes beyond what I can
discuss here. For additional discussion of this issue see (McLear 2015, 97–
106, 2016b, sec. 3.2).
25 For further discussion of the content of intuition, see (Allais 2009); (Tolley
2013); (McLear 2016b, 2016a).
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nies that the concept <substance> can be abstracted from reflection
on an (inner) intuition of the self. Despite this, the centrality of the tran-
scendental unity of apperception, especially in the B-Deduction, for
Kant’s argument concerning the categories suggests that there might
be a continued reliance on something like the Leibnizian strategy for
resolving the problem of the subject. However, one important differ-
ence from Kant’s pre-critical view is that the awareness in the pure
apperception of oneself as subject is wholly intellectual rather than
sensible. For example, Kant says,
this representation [viz. the “I think”] is an act [Actus] of spon-
taneity, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. (B-
Deduction §16, B132)
In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representa-
tions in general, on the contrary, hence in the synthetic original
unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear
to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This repre-
sentation is a thinking, not an intuiting. (B-Deduction §25, B157)
The consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intu-
ition at all, but a merely intellectual representation of the self-
activity of a thinking subject. (Refutation of Idealism, B278)
[I]f I have called the proposition “I think” an empirical propo-
sition, I would not say by this that the I in this proposition
is an empirical representation; for it is rather purely intellec-
tual, because it belongs to thinking in general. (Refutation of
Mendelssohn’s Proof of the Persistence of the Soul, B423)
Kant’s position in these passages is that the awareness of oneself as
the subject of mental activity is not sensory, but rather a special form
of intellectual representation, one that is neither judgment nor con-
cept but the basis for both. Kant terms this activity of intellectual self-
consciousness “pure apperception”.26 The critical Kant thus endorses
two important claims. First, he holds that self-consciousness is funda-
mentally bifurcated into sensory (i.e., inner intuition) and non-sensory
(i.e., pure apperception) modes.27 Second, he holds that the sensory
mode does not present a metaphysical subject — indeed it presents no
subject at all — and that it is only in pure apperception that one’s self
is presented, albeit in not in a manner that supports various inferences
of interest to the “rational psychologist” (more on this below).
Below I argue that Kant pursues what I have called the Leibnizian
strategy for resolving the problem of the subject. But given Kant’s
distinction between two different modes for apprehending oneself —
viz. intellectual vs. empirical — this means that we should expect that
only pure apperception is able to supply the content necessary for rep-
resenting a metaphysical subject or substance. In the next subsection
I motivate such a position by examining what I take to be a “gap” in
standard analyses of Kant’s conception of <substance>. I then go on
to canvas and reject the most plausible alternative interpretations of
Kant’s view before presenting and defending a positive argument for
construing pure apperception as central to the critical Kant’s reply to
the problem of the subject.
3.3 A Gap in Kant’s Conception of Substance
The conception of substance that I’ve been primarily concerned
with in this paper is the metaphysical conception of substance
(<substance>M) as that which substands and subsists.28 However,
26 He also occasionally calls pure apperception “reflection” (e.g., An 7:135n) or
“transcendental consciousness” (e.g., Refl 18:306 (1785–89)).
27 Kant rejects what, in contemporary discussion of this issue, has been called
the “Uniformity Thesis” regarding self-knowledge. See, e.g., (Boyle 2009,
141); cf. (Shoemaker 1988); (Burge 1996, 2013); (Moran 2001).
28 This metaphysical notion is the one clearly articulated by Kant’s immediate
predecessors. For example, see (Baumgarten 2013, 136); see also Wolff’s def-
inition of substance in specifically temporal terms (Wolff 1730, sec. 768) and
Kant’s notes on the Baumgarten passage (R3572–4 (c. 1764–70).
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the critical Kant is often taken to have only two distinct notions
of substance, the logical/grammatical notion of what I have called
<substance>L and the “schematized” notion of a <substance>S.29
<substance>L: the logical-grammatical conception of a term which
always takes subject rather than predicate place in a judgment
<substance>S: the schematized conception of substance as the per-
sisting and permanent substratum of change
Note that the concept <substance>M falls between the two other no-
tions. There are three significant features to such a conception. First,
the content of the metaphysical conception of substance includes the
notion of a real subject of inherence, rather than a merely logical sub-
ject of predication.30 Second, the real subject of inherence does not
itself inhere in anything else. It is, with respect to this relation, ulti-
mate.31 Third, the represented metaphysical dependence relation of
accident to subject is asymmetric. If A inheres in B, then B does not
inhere in A. Moreover, in contrast to <substance>S, the concept
<substance>M is not yet schematized. It does not refer to or other-
wise contain temporal content. So it is not the concept of a permanent
being, though the schematized <substance>S presupposes at least
two of the three elements specified in the metaphysical conception —
29 Van Cleve (1999, 105) marks the difference between the logical and meta-
physical notions, but construes Kant’s logico-grammatical discussion of sub-
ject and predicate as in fact marking “an ontological distinction between
kinds of entity, not a grammatical distinction between types of linguistic
item.”. For related distinctions between different conceptions of substance
in Kant’s work see (Bennett 1966, 182ff); (Langton 1998, ch. 3); (Proops 2010,
461).
30 For helpful discussion of this difference, understood as the difference be-
tween a “real ground” and a “logical ground”, see (Stang 2016, ch. 3).
31 Note that it is entirely compatible with this point that a metaphysical sub-
stance stand in some other real grounding relation to something else, e.g.,
that it is caused to exist by some other thing.
viz. the notion of a real substanding subject, and the notion of a real
asymmetric dependence relation between subject and accident.32
The concept <substance>M is distinct from and presupposed by
<substance>S. It is also my contention that <substance>M can-
not be analytically derived from the purely logical conception of a
<substance>L, as the former expresses a “real” metaphysical rela-
tionship not itself contained in the latter purely logical notion. Kant’s
purely logical conception of a substance, as that term which only ever
occupies subject place and never predicative place in a judgment, thus
cannot of itself provide the content for thinking of something as a meta-
physically real (final) subject of inherence.
This isn’t just a problem for any attempt to analytically derive
the content of <substance>M from <substance>L. To see the
basic problem with non-analytically deriving <substance>S from
<substance>L, and why some further account of the content is
needed, let’s first suppose it is true that, for Kant, there is a correla-
tion between the structure of a judgment and the structure of the bit
of reality concerning which that judgment is true. After all, he consid-
ers truth to be “the agreement of cognition with its object” (A58/B82).
32 Wolff, for example, clearly presupposes the metaphysical conception in his
temporalized definition of substance as “[a]n enduring and modifiable sub-
ject” in contrast to an accident, which is a being “that is not modifiable”
(Wolff 1730, sec. 768). Wolff’s definition presupposes that substances are sub-
jects of inherence (i.e., they substand) and that, as modifiable, they cannot
exist as accidents of anything else (i.e., they subsist). However, it is a mat-
ter of some controversy whether Kant conceives of phenomenal substance as
satisfying the subsistence condition for genuine substantiality, or whether
phenomenal substance merely stands in as a kind of surrogate or proxy for
genuine substance. For discussion of this issue, see (Langton 1998, 48ff; Van
Cleve 1999, 120–1 and 137-8; Ameriks 2000b, 269; Wuerth 2014, 95). The no-
tion of a “phenomenal substance” as a kind of proxy or stand-in for genuine
substance is defined by Baumgarten (§193) as an accident that merely seems
to subsist (Baumgarten 2013, 136). For the purposes of this paper I remain
neutral concerning whether Kant regards phenomenal substances as both
substanding and subsisting, or if he regards them as ersatz substances that
merely substand, with only things in themselves being genuine (i.e., non-
ersatz) substances.
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Then, on the simplest non-analytic derivation story (call this the “sim-
ple view”) about how the content of <substance>S is derived, we
simply add the concept of time to that of <substance>L.33 But the
logical conception, at best, seems to model only the subsistence feature
of substance, since, according to the logical conception, a term x occu-
pies subject, and not predicate, position. Adding temporal content to
this conception, as the simple view would have it, does not account for
all of the content present in the concept <substance>S, since it does
not account for a persistent substratum — i.e., something that really
substands. At best the view seems to show only that in thinking using
the concept <substance>S, we always (i.e., at all times) put the rele-
vant term x in subject place. But more than this is needed to account
for the content of <substance>M. Thus the simple view provides no
account of either the metaphysically real subject, or the dependence
relation between inhering accident and substantial subject.
If the simple view is inadequate, then Kant needs some other ac-
count of how we non-analytically derive or otherwise acquire the con-
tent for thinking of something as a real metaphysical subject on which
its accidents asymmetrically depend. If the simple view won’t work, what
alternative interpretations remain for Kant?
In this section I consider two possible (and, I think, the only plau-
sible) options for non-analytically deriving the (content of the) meta-
physical conception. According to the first alternative — what I call
the “logicist” interpretation — the categories are identical with the
logical functions of judgment, but applied (in a “real use” of the un-
derstanding) to intuition rather than concepts. Hence the category of
substance just is the categorical form of judgment as applied to in-
tuition. Crucially, according to the logicist, the real use of the logical
form brings with it new content, and thus fills the gap in conception
between <substance>L and <substance>S. According to the sec-
ond alternative — call this the “actualist” interpretation, which I fa-
33 This kind of approach is suggested by (Strawson 1966, 77).
vor — though logicism is right to link the categories with the logical
functions, the content of <substance>M cannot be derived from the
logical forms of judgment applied in a sensory context. Instead, this
content — and specifically the representation of an actual (wirklich)
and not merely logical form of dependence — stems from the pure
apperceptive awareness a thinker has of its own intellectual activity in
thinking. I thus claim that, in following this strategy, Kant maintains,
even in the critical period, a version of the Leibnizian strategy of de-
riving the content of the fundamental metaphysical concepts from self-
consciousness. It is here, in pure apperception, that the critical Kant
reaches for the source of our representation of a substance. I discuss
logicism and actualism in detail below.
3.3.1 Logicism
Kant makes several remarks that suggest he closely links the categories
with the logical forms of judgment. The latter are not simply a “clue”
or “guiding thread” (“Leitfaden”) to the organization of the table of
categories; they are the categories, at least in their “logical” use. The
central texts are as follows:
The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the
very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a
judgment into concepts ... also brings a transcendental content
into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the
manifold in intuition in general ... . (MD §10, B105)
[The categories] are concepts of an object in general, by means
of which its intuition is regarded as determined with regard to
one of the logical functions for judgments. (TD Transition, B128)
That action of the understanding ... through which the manifold
of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts)
is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical func-
tion of judgments. ... But now the categories are nothing other
than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold
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of a given intuition is determined with regard to them. (TD §20,
B143)
In the metaphysical deduction the origin of the a priori cate-
gories in general was established through their complete coinci-
dence [völlige Zusammentreffung] with the universal logical func-
tions of thinking. (TD §26, B159)
[The categories] are in turn nothing other than forms of thought,
which contain merely the logical capacity for unifying the man-
ifold given in intuition in a consciousness a priori. (Phenomena
& Noumena, B305–6)
[T]he pure concepts of the understanding are, of themselves,
nothing but logical functions, but that as such they do not con-
stitute the least concept of an object in itself but rather need
sensory intuition as a basis, and even then they serve only to
determine empirical judgments. (Pr §39, 4:324)
These texts communicate two important points. First, they indicate
Kant’s pursuit of a strategy for explaining how the pure categories,
or fundamental concepts of metaphysics, arise from the intellect. This
strategy aims to avoid commitment to any form of content nativism,
and it seems a promising way to avoid a problem that plagues Kant’s
account of intellectual concepts in the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation —
viz. explaining how the pure categories are “pure” in the sense of being
traceable only to the intellect, without thereby implicating either intel-
lectual intuition, which he denies, or sensible (inner) intuition, which
would undermine their claim to purity.
Second, the very same logical functions for combining representa-
tions (concepts) in judgment, and which constitute the basis of study
in what Kant calls “pure general logic”, are also the functions for com-
bining representations (intuitions) in our experience of objects.34 Thus
34 Here I agree with Tolley’s (2012) claim that pure general logic and transcen-
dental logic are completely coincident in their extension, differing only as
for the understanding as a faculty of judging (A69/B94), each logical
function of thinking (e.g., categorical judgment), when applied to a
multiplicity of intuitions, results in a distinctive way of relating to, or
“experiencing” in Kant’s technical sense, an object.
I take the story thus far to be, at least as interpretations of Kant
go, relatively uncontroversial, and should be acceptable to all parties
(including myself). The point of controversy comes in the next step. A
proponent of the logicist conception of the categories argues for a third
claim, in addition to the above two points, that the categories should
be understood to acquire their distinctive content by virtue of their es-
sential tie to combination in sensory intuition. For example, according
to Béatrice Longuenesse’s influential gloss, this means that “the log-
ical forms of judgment are forms of the unity of the combination of
concepts in judgment. The categories ‘universally represent’ forms of
the unity of the combination of representations in intuition. What they
add to the logical forms of judgment is thus the unity of intuitions under the
latter.”35 Relatedly, Stephen Engstrom states that “the logical form in
its potential for material and real use constitutes a category, one of the
understanding’s original ‘concepts of an object in general.’ ”36
Given that the categories “add to the logical forms of judgment”, as
Longuenesse puts it, I understand the logicist view to claim that the
very same function of the intellect for combination is distinguished by
virtue of its use in judgment (i.e., logical use) or intuition (i.e., real use).
Now, on the most straightforward reading of this proposal, in the real
use of the logical function, it (now understood as a category) acquires
additional content that is non-analytically related to the logical forms of
judgment. Moreover, this additional content comes from the essential
relation the logical forms have to synthesizing a sensory manifold in
intuition. The logical forms guide synthesis in the intuition of objects,
hylomorphic aspects — viz. the form (pure general) and matter (transcen-
dental) of logic.
35 (Longuenesse 2000, 94, my emphasis).
36 (Engstrom 2018, 247–8).
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and in virtue of this, can stand as general or “reflected” representations
(i.e., the categories) under which such intuited objects may be sub-
sumed.37 For the logicist, since the categories make essential reference
to the synthetic unity of a sensible manifold (whether that manifold is
spatial or temporal or some other sensible form entirely), this explains
where the additional content of the category (e.g., of <substance>M)
comes from. Ultimately though, the categories are nothing over and
above the logical forms, but are rather the forms as employed in a
specific context (i.e., forms of a specifically sensory matter).
However, at least with respect to the specific issue of the category
of substance, I do not see how logicism can succeed in providing an
explanation of the relevant content if one agrees (i) that the logical-
grammatical conception of substance is distinct from the metaphysi-
cal conception, and (ii) that the experiential conception contains more
content than that of a temporal relation holding between the refer-
ent of the subject term or concept and the referent of the predicate
term or concept. Recall that the problem with the “simple view”, dis-
cussed above, lies in explaining how either the content of a metaphys-
ically real subject or asymmetric dependence is supplied to the con-
cept <substance>S if the only material at hand is that of the merely
logical-grammatical notion and a formal feature of intuition (i.e., time).
Now, if one accepts that the simple view is defective, then what
does the logicist view add to supply the requisite model of real asym-
metric dependence that the simple view lacks? There seem to be three
options: (i) the addition is basic or brute and cannot be explained in
further terms; (ii) the content of the logical form itself is more robust
than I have so far allowed; (iii) the additional content may be abstracted
(or extracted) out of experience in a manner that it cannot be from the
logical form of the category or the pure intuition (or related concept)
of time alone. Let me take these in turn.
37 (Longuenesse 2000, 96).
On the first option, the content of the metaphysical concept derives
from a basic or primitive connection between (a) the logical concept
and (b) the pure form of intuition.38 Since this is a basic or primitive
connection between logical form and intuition, it cannot be explained
in further terms. One might argue that this position is suggested by
the fact that Kant himself seems to think his method for spelling out
the transcendental conditions of experience — understood in terms of
synthetic a priori knowledge — does not demand elucidation of the
conditions of those very conditions.39 If this is correct, then according
to the primitivist position Kant need only show that appeal to logical
form and the pure forms of intuition is necessary for the categorial
representation of reality, not how this occurs.
However, the primitivist position has at least two shortcomings.
First, it is rationally unsatisfying, since it denies that there can be any
further explanation of the connection between the content of the forms
of judgment and the categories. Second, it is unsatisfactory by Kant’s
own lights. One of the tendentious claims that Kant is aware that he is
making concerns the fact that there are concepts whose content does
not derive from experience, and thus whose legitimacy in applying to
objects of experience is open to question. For example, one of the aims
of the Metaphysical Expositions of the Transcendental Aesthetic is to
account for the source and nature of the content of our a priori con-
cepts of space and time. In introducing the Transcendental Deduction
in §13, Kant claims that a deduction of the source of the categories
is significantly more difficult (A87–8/B119–20), especially since their
content is such as to be universal (in being a priori) but not grounded
38 In the case of finite discursive subjects such as ourselves, the pure form in
question is time. In creatures radically different from us, there may be some
other pure form that plays the relevant role in cognition. Such a form would
have to be like time in being a universal condition of appearances, even if
it were otherwise radically different. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
encouraging clarity on this point.
39 See especially (Marshall 2014) for discussion of this issue.
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in any experience at all (and so arousing “suspicion” as to their legiti-
macy).
Moreover, given Kant’s exhaustive distinction between ana-
lytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori judgment, he needs some way
of accounting for all content by means of such a priori or a posteri-
ori sources. And if my distinction between the three conceptions of
<substance> is cogent, then the primitivist story does not explain
how <substance> has the content it does. If this is correct, then ad-
verting to a primitivist explanation of the content of the categories is a
kind of mysterianism unacceptable even by Kant’s own standards. For
this reason we should reject the primitivist defense of logicism.
Moving to the second option, a defender of logicism might try to
defend a more robust conception of the logical form of judgment con-
stituting a category’s content. This strategy rejects my characterization
of the content of the purely logical conception of the categories (e.g., of
<substance>L) as merely “grammatical”, and thus as failing to pro-
vide the content for representing a real asymmetric dependence rela-
tion.
To adjudicate this dispute over the status of the logical form of
judgment, we need to get clearer on Kant’s conception of judgment. In
general Kant describes concepts as rules or functions for “the order-
ing of different representations under a common one” (A68/B93). This
ordering is enacted when one representation is “subordinated” (unter-
geordnet) “under” another, as a species (or the members thereof) is to
its genus (or the members thereof), and it is this subordination relation
that is involved in the cognitive activity of judging.40 And though all
concepts have the “form” of generality and mediacy, Kant considers a
specific concept to be constituted by its “content” (Inhalt), which con-
40 The view of a concept as a representational act, which may only be carried
out in judgment, of subordinating representations under a common one has
been heavily emphasized by many commentators. See, for example, (Paton
1936, 1:285; Strawson 1966, 94; Pippin 1982, 33). For discussion and criticism
of the interpretation of concepts as employed entirely in acts of judgment,
see (Grüne 2009); (Land 2015); cf. (Heis 2013).
sists of the simpler and more general marks (themselves concepts) un-
der which that concept falls (JL 9:95). For example, <human> consists
of various marks, one of which is <animal>. The concept <human>
thus “falls under” and thereby “contains” the concept <animal> and
is thus subordinate to it.41
The containment metaphor thus stands for the manner in which
a concept relates to others in a hierarchy of genus/species relation-
ships, with each species being formed from its genus by the addition
of some differential mark (as <rational> when added to <animal>
forms the species concept <human>). The more specific concepts are
contained “under” the more general concepts, and have those more
general concepts as their content. Staying with our example, because
<rational> and <animal> are both higher (i.e. more general) rel-
ative to <human>, <human> would therefore be subordinated under
each of them, in each concept’s “extension” (Umfang) or “sphere”
(Sphäre). Reciprocally, <human> would nevertheless itself contain both
<rational> and <animal> in itself, as parts of its own content.42 The
concept <human> is thus subordinate to these other concepts in that
their possession is necessary for thinking of something as human. But
this analytic dependence of <human> on <animal> and <rational>
cannot be of help to the logicist, since it is not a real asymmetric de-
pendence relation.
However, Kant also uses ‘subordination’ in a different sense, with
respect to judgment, not as subordination of representations under a
predicate, but in terms of the predicate’s being subordinate to the subject
41 Engstrom describes this as “analytic subordination” or “subordination in
content”, which he contrasts with “synthetic subordination” or “subordi-
nation in use” (2018, 245n32; cf. Longuenesse 1998, 93–4), which I discuss
further below. Both acts of subordination involve ordering one or more rep-
resentations “under” a common logical ground — in the analytic case, the
subordination of a concept and its objects to a predicate (e.g., of the objects
falling under <bachelor> to <unmarried>); in the synthetic case, the sub-
ordination of a predicate to a subject (e.g., of <slovenly> to <bachelor>).
42 For discussion, see (De Jong 1995, 623–6; Longuenesse 1998, ch. 4; Anderson
2005, 2015, chs. 2–3; Tolley 2012, 433–4).
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term in the (categorical) judgment.43 This might be a more promising
notion for the logicist to pursue. For example, Kant says,
As to relation, judgments are either categorical or hypothetical or
disjunctive. The given representations in judgment are subordi-
nated one to another for the unity of consciousness, namely,
either as predicate to subject, or as consequence to ground, or as
member of the division to the divided concept. (JL §23 9:104; see also
JL §§58-60 9:121–2; A322/B378; R3095 16:656 (1769–75))
Here the idea is not that representations are subordinate or “fall under”
the predicate, but rather that the predicate is subordinated (in some
different sense) to the subject.
Kant also sometimes speaks of the subject term of a judgment as
the “condition” (Bedingung) of the assertion of the predicate in a way
that is relevant to understanding the above described alternative “sub-
ordination” of predicate to concept. For example, Kant says in the Tran-
scendental Dialectic of the first Critique,
The proposition ‘Caius is mortal’ I could indeed derive from ex-
perience by means of the understanding alone. But I am in pur-
suit of a concept (in this case, the concept ‘man’) that contains
the condition under which the predicate (assertion in general)
of this judgment is given; and after I have subsumed under this
condition taken in its whole extension (‘All men are mortal’):
thus do I proceed thereby to determine the cognition of my ob-
ject (‘Caius is mortal’). (A322/B378)
The basic idea here is that in an act of judgment whereby some predi-
cate is asserted of (or “determines”) some object (via the subject term),
the subject term is the condition, or logical ground, of the assertion
being made — i.e., of the predicate being asserted of the subject. The
logicist might thus appeal to the notion of the subject term as a condi-
43 For discussion, see (Longuenesse 1998, 86–90; Anderson 2015, 99–104).
tion of the predicate in accounting for the real asymmetric dependence
relation represented by the content of <substance>M.
Engstrom (2018, 2.1) has recently articulated a sophisticated version
of this kind of strategy. He argues for the existence of an asymmetry
at the level of the subject-predicate relation itself, based on this notion
of the subject term as the condition of the predicate. If successful, this
would perhaps provide the basis for modeling the asymmetric real
inherence relation present in <substance>M. As Engstrom puts it,
A categorical judgment can accordingly be regarded as lying,
strictly speaking, in the assertion of what is thought through the
use of the concept serving as predicate, for in that assertion the
use of the concept serving as subject is consciously presupposed.
The judgment is therefore an act in which another act, namely
the use of the concept serving as subject, is contained, as the in-
ner condition enabling the assertion of what is thought through
the use of the concept figuring as predicate.44
If I understand Engstrom correctly, the putative fact that there is this
internal and asymmetric dependence of predicate on subject in an act
of (assertoric) judgment is then the basis, in the real use of a category,
for the representation of a real (and not merely logical) asymmetric
dependence of accident on subject. As Engstrom elaborates,
it can be seen that in the real use of the categorical form, the act
of subordinating the predicate to the subject constitutes a rep-
44 (Engstrom 2018, 246). Note that Engstrom construes assertion and judgment
as tightly linked by Kant. On Engstrom’s reading, the act of grasping a truth-
functional content (judging) goes along with the putting forward of that
content as true (assertion). Engstrom (2018, 246n23), however, notes, “Kant
does not explicitly mark the now familiar distinction between predication
and assertion ... but by distinguishing modalities of judgment he is able
to accommodate non-assertoric predication, for instance in compound judg-
ments (A74–6/B99–101).” For discussion of the issue of the connection be-
tween assertion and judgment in the Early Modern period see, e.g., (Geach
1960; Hylton 1984; Buroker 1994; Owen 2003). For discussion of Kant on
their connection, see (Nuchelmans 1983, 252–4; McLear 2016b, 106–12).
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resentation in which what is thought through the subject and
what is thought through the predicate are conceived as so or-
dered that while the former does not depend for its possibility
on the latter, the latter depends for its possibility both on the for-
mer, as its internal condition (or as the real of whose existence
it is a determination), and also on a further condition, lying out-
side it.45
The parallel between the three “moments” of judging — viz. the
use of a subject term, a predicate term, and assertion of the latter of the
former — and the structure of the being so judged is then elaborated:
(a) just as the positing of the subject is prior to the predication
that determines it, so the existence of a real subject is prior to
a determination of its existence;
(b) just as the predication depends on the positing of the subject
it determines, so a real determination depends on the exis-
tence of a real subject; and
(c) just as the predication depends also on some condition in
sensibility outside the positing of the subject, so a determi-
nation of a thing’s existence depends also on some condition
in reality outside the existence of the real subject, namely on
something indeterminately represented through the sensible
condition on which the predication is conscious of itself as
also depending.46
Engstrom’s account, if correct, would provide an explanation of the
way in which the real use of the categorical form captures a depen-
dence relation in the world, derived from the logical form of the cate-
gory itself.
However, Engstrom’s position depends on the claim that the sub-
ject term is the “inner condition” (246) of the assertion of the predicate
45 (Engstrom 2018, 250).
46 (Engstrom 2018, 250).
term, such that there is a genuine relation of asymmetric dependence
instantiated, and which can serve as a model conforming to the meta-
physical case. But I see at least four problems with this claim.
First, it is not at all obvious that Kant’s conception of a condition
— i.e., of a subject term as the condition of an asserted predicate —
fits the kind of asymmetric dependence relation that Engstrom de-
scribes. The notion of predicate as subordinate to subject, or the latter
as the condition of the former, as described in the passages from the
Critique and the Logic quoted above, is one concerning conditions on
inference.47 For example, in the example Kant uses (A322/B378) of the
judgment ‘Caius is mortal’ the condition of the predicate <mortal>
is not <Caius> but rather <man>. Moreover, <man> is such a condi-
tion because its positing is sufficient for positing <mortal>. It is thus,
insofar as Caius is a human being, that it can rationally be asserted
of him that he is mortal, though there are obviously other ways in
which something may be mortal than by being human. The (sufficient)
conditioning of predicate by subject is thus always mediated by some
further term under which the subject (in this case <Caius>) is itself
subsumed in the purely logical sense of ‘subordination’ we examined
above.48 There is not obviously such a mediating element between sub-
stance and its properties.49
Second, Engstrom says, if “no concept [were] used as subject, no
assertion would be possible” (247). But this point applies equally to
the predicate, for one cannot assert anything by means of a subject
47 See especially (Longuenesse 1998, 93–5ff) for discussion.
48 (Longuenesse 1998, 95).
49 One might, following Wolf, try a distinction here between “absolute” pred-
ication (or predication nulla adjecta conditione), concerning essential prop-
erties, and “hypothetical” predication (or predication sub adjecta conditione)
concerning contingent properties. See (Longuenesse 1998, 99–101). However,
I don’t see that this would work, for the notion of “condition” here seems
different from that which Engstrom requires. In Engstrom’s (2018, 246) case
he is looking to the subject term as the “condition of the possibility” of
the asserted predicate, but in the case of absolute predication the subject is
merely the sufficient condition of the asserted predicate.
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term/concept alone. In defense of Engstrom’s point, one might argue
here that Kant sometimes suggests that in the assertion of some ex-
istent thing — what Kant calls “absolute positing” — a subject is as-
serted without a predicate concept.50 Consider, for example, Kant’s
discussion of the issue of God’s existence:
Now if I take the subject (God) together with all his predicates
(among which omnipotence belongs), and say God is, or there
is a God, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God,
but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates (A598–
9/B626–7)
One might thus argue that here <God> is asserted (posited) without
a correlate predicate. However, I don’t believe such an argument suc-
ceeds. We can see this by briefly examining Kant’s view of positing.
Kant’s distinction between absolute and relative positing marks a
distinction between, respectively, positing an object as instantiating
some predicate, and positing a relation between two predicates as-
serted in a judgment. Consider the following description of positing
from Kant’s pre-critical (1763) discussion of God’s existence:
The concept of positing [Position] or setting [Setzung] is perfectly
simple: it is identical with the concept of being in general. Now
something can be thought as posited merely relatively, or to ex-
press the matter better, it can be thought merely as the relation
(respectus logicus) of something as a characteristic mark of a thing.
In this case, being, that is to say, the positing of this relation, is
nothing other than the copula in a judgment. If what is consid-
50 This is not something that I take Engstrom himself to claim. He contends
that the positing of the subject in the first moment of a categorical judgment
“is not a free-standing pure existential judgment” (Engstrom 2018, 250n32).
He goes on to say, “Pure existential judgments (S is, S exists) are always
derived from affirmative categorical judgments, in which posited subjects
are determined.”
ered is not merely the relation but the thing posited in and for
itself, then this being is the same as existence. (OPA 2:73)
So in saying that God exists, one absolutely posits the existence
of an object that instantiates <God>. In saying that God is wise, one
relatively posits a relation between two predicates <God> and <wise>
(cf. OPA 2:74). Further, the position Kant stakes out in the discussion
of the concept <God> at A598–9/B626–7 is not one according to which
a subject concept is asserted in the absence of a predicate. Rather, what
Kant says there is that some existent thing is (absolutely) posited as
existing, and that <God> is truly predicated of that thing. This is clearly
his position in the 1763 discussion, where he says:
If I say ‘God is an existent thing’ it looks as if I am expressing
the relation of a predicate to a subject. But there is an impropri-
ety in this expression. Strictly speaking, the matter ought to be
formulated like this: ‘Something existent is God.’ In other words,
there belongs to an existent thing those predicates which, taken
together, we designate by means of the expression ‘God.’ These
predicates are posited relative to the subject, whereas the thing
itself, together with all its predicates, is posited absolutely. (OPA
2:74)
As this text makes clear, even a case of absolute positing includes the
predication of a concept. So if the above is correct, the case of abso-
lute positing is no counterexample to the claim that acts of assertion
require both a subject and a predicate, for in absolute positing, a pred-
icate is still asserted.51 Hence, Engstrom’s claim that no predicate may
be asserted without a subject may be true, but it is also true that no sub-
ject may be asserted without a predicate. The grammatical fact of the
subject’s place in an assertion does not therefore give us the asymme-
51 For more discussion of absolute vs. relative positing see (Stang 2016, sec.
2.8).
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try necessary for explicating the real relation between substance and
inhering property.
Third, while the truth of a categorical judgment depends on a rela-
tion between subject and predicate (e.g., in analytic judgment, contain-
ment of the latter in the former), this is not the same as the predicate
depending on the subject. Moreover, as Kant indicates in his discus-
sion of <substance> in the Dialectic, accidents “are not really subor-
dinated to [substance], but are rather the way substance itself exists”
(A414/B441). What this seems to indicate is that the kind of logical
subordination characterized by the logical forms doesn’t really cap-
ture the difference between the real coordination relation of properties
in subsistence-inherence and the real subordination relation of causes in
cause-effect.52 And if no relevant asymmetry can be generated in the
purely logical structure of the judgment, there will be nothing that can
stand in “conformity” (as Engstrom puts it), in the acts constituting
a judgment, with the metaphysical structure of the inherence relation
instantiated between property and substance.
Related closely to this third point there is a fourth and more general
problem that any logicist approach faces, even if it could articulate the
right kind of logical asymmetry between subject and predicate. This
is the problem of explaining how the logical formal relation between
subject and predicate can represent a real relation between substance
and inhering accident. Recall that Engstrom says that
(b) just as the predication depends on the positing of the subject
it determines, so a real determination depends on the exis-
tence of a real subject
Here, and similarly for the other conditions, Engstrom contends that
the logical relation marks out a form of dependence that is also really
52 Engstrom notes this difference between forms of subordination (246n22),
but suggests that it is due simply to the fact that “while a predicate is no
less dependent on its subject than is a consequent on its ground, it does not
constitute a separate judgment in its own right.”
instantiated between the substance and its accident. But why think that
the logical relation marked in the categorical judgment can represent
(or otherwise be relevantly analogous to) a real relation? Put another
way, why think that the dependence relation (even if asymmetric) be-
tween the subject, as logical ground, and a predicate, is of the same
kind as the real relation between a substance, as real ground, and its
inhering properties? In fact, Kant’s distinction between logical and real
grounds, first articulated in the 1760s and developed through the crit-
ical period, aims precisely at denying any such connection between
logical and real grounds.53 This is clearest in Kant’s discussion of the
ground-consequent relation, but a related point holds for subsistence-
inherence. Let me first briefly discuss the notion of a logical ground
before making the point about subsistence-inherence.
A logical ground is one that posits its consequence solely by
virtue of logical principles, such as the principle of identity or non-
contradiction. So A is a logical ground of B just in case falling under
A is sufficient for falling under B. So <human> is a logical ground of
<animal> in that falling under the former is sufficient for falling un-
der the latter. In this way a concept is the logical ground of any of its
marks. It is clear that a logical ground, so understood, is governed by
the principle of non-contradiction. For if A is the logical ground of B,
then an object cannot be such as to be both A and not B.54
Kant’s position in the 1760s and later is that there are grounds that
are not logical grounds. This means that A can be the (non-logical)
ground of B even if it is the case that something can be both A and
not B. Causation is the paradigmatic case for Kant (Metaphysik Herder
28:549; Metaphysik Mrongovius 29:808, 843). A can causally ground B’s
existence even if there is no contradiction in positing A but not B.
Subsistence-inherence is also a real, as opposed to logical, grounding
53 For extensive discussion of the following points or issues related thereto, see
(Stang 2019); cf. (Watkins 2005, 162–70 and chs. 4–5 passim, 2019; Longue-
nesse 2001; Stang 2016, 82–91; Stratmann 2018).
54 See (Anderson 2005; Stang 2019, 89–90).
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relation (A181/B225). For example, there is no logical contradiction in
a substance’s instantiating forces of various magnitudes, while it may
yet be really impossible for there to be such co-instantiated forces in a
single being (NM 2:171–2).
But if subsistence-inherence is a real, as opposed to logical, ground-
ing relation, what explains how we are able to (even erronously) rep-
resent such a real relation? It cannot be by virtue of anything about
intuition (or its content), for Kant is quite clear that the relational
categories are not necessary for the possibility of intuition, nor is
their content contained in intuition or the appearances given by in-
tuition (A178/B220). But the content cannot come from the logical
form of judgment either, since Kant is clear that logical grounds can-
not be real grounds. So how could one ever even represent a real re-
lation of subsistence-inherence? From the point of view of the logi-
cist, such a question might seem ill-conceived. For the logicist, rep-
resentation of a real relation just is the representation of a logical
relation in a sensory context (for us, a temporal context). But this,
I contend, misses Kant’s point that we can, in experience, represent
real relations that are not themselves due to (or derived from, or de-
pendent on) logical principles and that we cannot rely on representa-
tion of logical relationships to determine what is really possible.55 On
Kant’s view, just as we distinguish between the representational con-
tent <subsistence-inherence> from that of <cause-effect>,
each of which is necessary for representing the corresponding real
relations, so too do we distinguish between the content necessary
for representing a logical and real relation (i.e., between <logical
necessitation> and <real necessitation>). But how could we
derive the latter from the former?
55 Kant’s discussion at A414/B441–2 is again relevant here. See also Kant’s dis-
cussion in the Metaphysik Mrongovius of the ground-consequence relation in
judgment as merely analytic or logical and as distinct from that real rela-
tion between posited ground and consequent discussed by metaphysicians
(29:820); cf. A279/B335, A721/B749.
Given these problems, I do not see how a defender of logicism can
appeal to logical form itself to generate either the needed asymmetry
or the representation of a real relation, and this brings us back to the
problem with which we started — viz. what is it that is added in the
real use of a function of the understanding that generates the content
<substance>M?56
This brings us to the third option for the logicist view, which con-
cedes that while neither the logical function of judgment nor the pure
form of time provide the needed content concerning dependence, the
combination of the two in the experience of an object do. According to
this version of the view, the experiential conception contains the meta-
physical conception (i.e., it is a more determinate version of it). We can
then acquire the metaphysical conception by acquiring the experiential
concept. We can then isolate the metaphysical concept <substance>M
from its temporal specification by a process of abstraction.57
The problem with this option is that, like the primitivist, it leaves
the source of the content of <substance>M wholly mysterious. Kant
construes abstraction as the isolation or extraction of an already
present content.58 Since our aim is to discover from whence the con-
tent specific to <substance>M comes, we cannot simply appeal to
abstraction from experience, for this restates the problem. All can con-
cede that the experiential concept contains the metaphysical as part
56 One further variant of this strategy, suggested by an anonymous referee,
would be to claim that the logical functions are themselves derived from ap-
perception of one’s own activity, after which the categories are then derived
from the logical functions in accord with the logicist strategy. As we’ve seen,
though, Kant’s description of the logical functions (particularly categorical
judgment), at least on the most straightforward conception of ‘logical’, does
not provide the requisite notion of dependence. Alternatively, if the logical
forms themselves present real content by virtue of being derived from ap-
perception, the variant collapses into a version of the apperception view that
I discuss below.
57 Thanks to Nick Stang, Sergio Tenenbaum, and an anonymous referee for
pressing versions of this objection.
58 See his remarks on abstraction in the Inaugural Dissertation, Anthropology,
and the Logic (ID 2:394; An 7:131; JL 9:95, note 2).
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of its content. The question is where that metaphysical content comes
from, and we have seen that it cannot come from empirical or pure in-
tuition, and it cannot come simply from the logical function in judging.
It is not clear that there is any further experience-constituting element
to which the logicist can appeal. The third option, then, fails to explain
what needs explaining, and for that reason should be rejected.
Hence, none of the three ways in which one might try to character-
ize logicism results in an explanation of the content of <substance>M,
and specifically the kind of real asymmetric dependence to which the
metaphysical conception of a substanding entity appeals. So while the
logicist interpretation is certainly a plausible attempt at a non-analytic
derivation of the schematized or experiential notion of the category of
substance from its purely logical form, it does not ultimately provide
an adequate explanation of the source of the kind of content that we
have been examining with respect to the purely metaphysical concep-
tion.
Despite the problems I’ve laid out for the logicist view, one might
nevertheless defend it by arguing that the logicist view sees an impor-
tant advantage over any other attempt to explain the content of the
categories. For it might seem that any appeal to something other than
the logical forms of judgment for categorial content goes against Kant’s
derivational strategy in the Metaphysical Deduction. Why would Kant
need to appeal to apperception for content if he took his argument
in the Metaphysical Deduction, an argument that appears before the
extended discussion of apperception in the Transcendental Deduction,
as broadly cogent? This question is worth addressing in some detail.
As we have seen, Kant conceives of the categories as exemplifying
in their forms of combination the “very same actions” (B105) through
which judgments are provided logical form. The Metaphysical Deduc-
tion thus provides a “clue”, or more literally, a “guiding thread” (Leit-
faden), to the table of categories. The existence of the Metaphysical
Deduction might then be seen as evidence against the interpretation
I’m proposing, for, if I am correct, Kant’s reliance on apperception in
the way I claim might undermine his argumentative strategy for all
the categories, insofar as they are supposed to be derived or derivable
from the forms of judgment alone.59 Does the appeal to apperception
therefore make the Metaphysical Deduction otiose?
Consider two points in response to this worry. First, one might ar-
gue that Kant may not intend to derive all the categories directly from
acts of apperception, rather than, e.g., merely from possession of the
capacity.60 Perhaps each grouping admits of a different derivation strat-
egy with respect to apperception. For example, perhaps only the cate-
gories of relation are so connected to apperception that they gain their
metaphysical content from specific acts.61 However, one might worry
that this is too ‘rhapsodic’ an approach to be a viable option for Kant.
In light of this sort of worry I evaluate some options for deriving the
content of the other categories in a manner consistent with the one I
outline for <substance>M in §3.4 below.
Second, assuming that all the categories owe at least some of their
structure or content to apperception, this does not render otiose the
strategy Kant pursues in the argument of the Metaphysical Deduction,
for there Kant is primarily concerned to provide some unitary and a
59 Thanks to Colin Marshall, Eric Watkins, and Tobias Rosefeldt for helpful
discussion of this point.
60 For an argument aimed at showing how all of the categories derive from the
principle of apperception (i.e., that the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany
every representation of mine), see (Schulting 2012). Though I am sympa-
thetic to many of Schulting’s claims, his strategy differs significantly from
mine. He is concerned with the principle of apperception, whereas I appeal
to the structure of apperception itself. He argues that the derivation is log-
ical and analytic. I argue that it is synthetic (i.e., there is content acquired
via self-consciousness). Moreover, Schulting argues that Kant engages in the
derivation of the categories, albeit in a thoroughly condensed fashion, in the
first part of the B-Deduction. I make no such claim. However, I in various
ways agree with Schulting regarding how Kant exploits various links be-
tween the categories and self-consciousness. See §3.4 below.
61 It is of interest here that in Kant’s notes for a deduction in the 1770s, of
the three “titles of the understanding” with which he is concerned, two are
relational categories (i.e., <cause> and <substance>). See (Guyer 1987);
(Carl 1989a, 82–103); (Laywine 2005, 2006) for relevant discussion.
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priori basis for determining exactly which of our concepts are cogni-
tively fundamental and a priori. He says,
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obli-
gation to seek its concepts in accordance with a principle, since
they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding, as abso-
lute unity, and must therefore be connected among themselves
in accordance with a concept or idea. Such a connection, how-
ever, provides a rule by means of which the place of each pure
concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of
them together can be determined a priori, which would other-
wise depend upon whim or chance. (A67/B92)
This then is the central role for the argument of the Metaphysical De-
duction, in providing a principled and a priori basis for exhaustively
determining which are the fundamental concepts. As Kant notes, there
are a variety of pure a priori concepts (e.g., see his discussion of the
“predicables” at A82/B108). So we need some account of which pure a
priori concepts are fundamental to our cognition of objects. Kant thus
wants an account that
has not arisen rhapsodically from a haphazard search for pure
concepts, of the completeness of which one could never be cer-
tain, since one would only infer it through induction, without
reflecting that in this way one would never see why just these
and not other concepts should inhabit the pure understanding.
(A81/B106–7)
Analysis of the logical functions of judging avoids a “rhapsodic” search
for pure concepts because it tells us something about which acts of the
intellect might be fundamental — viz. the basic logical acts of judg-
ment through which any concept is applied. Analysis of these acts thus
gives a “clue” to which fundamental concepts might be relevant to our
cognition through concepts — viz. those concepts that arise from re-
flection on the very logical acts in question. But one can hold that Kant
conceives of the categories as acquired via reflection on such logical
acts, without thereby being committed to holding that the content of
the categories is nothing over and above those logical acts. As we’ll see
in the next subsection, the content might also include that which is con-
tained in the reflective awareness of the acts, as distinct from the acts
themselves. One can thus agree with the logicist that the categories are
closely tied to the basic logical forms, while yet disagreeing that the
entirety of the content of the categories is yielded by those forms.
Hence, if I am right concerning the connection between appercep-
tion and the content of the concept <substance>, and it is true that
there is a similar connection for all the other categories, there would
still remain a need for a principled account specifying which a priori
concepts are the fundamental ones, just like the kind Kant sketches
in the Metaphysical Deduction. Thus, given these points, and the prob-
lems for the various versions of the logicist view elaborated above, I do
not see logicism as providing a satisfactory explanation of the content
at issue here.
3.3.2 Actualism
If logicism construes the concept <substance> as determining its con-
tent entirely in virtue of the logical form of categorical judgment, the
“actualist” approach I argue for construes the real, thinking subject as a
source of content for <substance>. As Kant puts it in the Refutation
of Mendelssohn’s proof in the B-Paralogisms, with the ‘I think’ of pure
apperception we “begin not from the concept of a thinking being in
general but from an actuality [einer Wirklichkeit]” (B418). According to
the interpretation I propose, the critical Kant derives the content of the
concept <substance>M from the pure apperception of the actuality
of the thinking subject and its activity.
One virtue of this interpretation is that it helps explain the emphasis
Kant places on the importance of self-consciousness in the deduction
of the categories as well as statements he makes in the A-edition of the
Paralogisms. These texts were mentioned in the introduction but are
worth quoting here in full.
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[The principles of] the objective determination of all representa-
tions, insofar as cognition can come from them ... are all derived
[abgeleitet] from the principle of the transcendental unity of ap-
perception. (Transcendental Deduction §19, B142).
Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the cat-
egories, which for their part represent nothing other than the
synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as that manifold
has unity in apperception. ... Hence of the thinking I (the soul),
which [thus represents] itself as substance ... one can say not so
much that it cognizes itself through the categories, but that it
cognizes the categories, and through them all objects, in the ab-
solute unity of apperception, and hence cognizes them through
itself. (Observation on the sum of the pure doctrine of the soul,
A401–2, original emphasis)
Should we take seriously Kant’s claims that the categories are “de-
rived” from apperception, and that apperception is the “ground of the
possibility” of categories a thinker cognizes “through itself”? If what I
have said so far is cogent, then we have good reason for taking these
remarks at face value, for there needs to be an explanation of the cat-
egorial content of <substance>M, and given that we’ve eliminated
mere analysis, (inner) intuition, and the derivation of <substance>M
from the sheer logical form of categorical judgment, there seems no
other recourse than that of pure apperception.
First, as we’ve already seen above, Kant clearly denies that sensory
intuition can provide a subject with the representational content of a
<substance>M. This much is plain from the discussion, above, that
the senses do not combine anything and that the relational categories
are constitutive of experience but not intuition.
Second, Kant forecloses other possible sources of the content
<substance>M. The content cannot be innate. Kant is explicit in his
reply to Eberhard that neither the categories nor the forms of intuition
are innately possessed by the subject upon its creation (OD 8:222–3).62
Concerning the categories themselves, Kant also speaks of their “given-
ness” (A728–9/B756–7), as well as the “occasional causes of their gen-
eration” (A86/B118).63 None of these statements make sense if Kant
regarded the content of the categories as innate.64
If the above is correct, and allowing a third premise — that all
representational content is derived from either a priori or a posteri-
ori sources — the conclusion would seem to follow. The only possible
source for the concept <substance>M is the purely intellectual rep-
resentation of oneself in the act of thinking. In sum, the argument I
ascribe to Kant is as follows:
1. Sensory intuition cannot provide the representational content for
the concept <substance>M.
2. Other than the subject of thought (i.e., the self-consciousness of
pure apperception), there are no relevant a priori sources of a priori
content.
3. All representational content is based on either a priori or a posteri-
ori (experiential) sources.
4. ∴ The only possible source of the representation of a
<substance>M is the purely intellectual representation of one-
self in the act of thinking — i.e., pure apperception, or self-
consciousness, provides us with the content of the concept
<substance>M.
This argument from elimination does not, however, give us any real
sense as to why pure apperception is a proper source for the content
62 For discussion, see (Allison 1973); see also (Vanzo 2018).
63 See also Refl. 4172 (1769–70), 17:443; Metaphysik L1, 28:190, 233–4 (1777–80);
Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:762–3 (1782/3); Metaphysik Volckmann, 28:373–4
(1784/85).
64 It also will not do to say that Kant, like Leibniz, holds a dispositional theory
of innateness. Dispositional nativism does not resolve the problem of the
subject. Even on such a view, Kant must still explain where the content
comes from.
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of <substance>M. How, then, might pure apperception provide the
relevant content of something’s substanding and subsisting?65
Kant closely connects the concepts <action>, <causation>, and
<substance>, as is clear from his remark in the Second Analogy that
Where there is action [Handlung], consequently activity
[Tätigkeit] and power [Kraft], there is also substance, and in this
alone must the seat of this fruitful source of appearances be
sought. (A204/B250)
Kant also characterizes an act (Handlung) as that which “already sig-
nifies the relation of the subject of causality to the effect” (A205/B250).
Kant further characterizes these links in metaphysics lectures from the
critical period:
Action [Handeln] and effect [Wirkung] can only be ascribed to
substance. Action is the determination of the force [Kraft] of a
substance as a cause of a certain accident [accidentis]. Causality
[Causalitas] is the characteristic of a substance insofar as it is
considered as the cause of an accident [accidentis]. (Metaphysik
Pölitz 28:564–5 (1790/1))66
The connection between <action>, <causation>, and
<substance> is important because Kant repeatedly character-
izes thinking or judging as an act (e.g., B130, A294/B350) and
construes pure apperception as the intellectual awareness of these acts.
These acts bring about certain effects — viz. judgments or thoughts —
65 There is also the related question of how any act of apperceptive reflection
and abstraction can generate a concept at all, much less one of the categories.
This is an important issue, but I lack the space to properly address it here.
Instead I assume, with Kant, that reflection can result in the possession of a
new concept, and ask only how it might be thought to work in the case of
<substance>.
66 For extensive discussion of this conception of an act, as well as the related
notions of substance and power in Kant’s work, see (Watkins 2005, chs. 4–5;
Smit 2009; Wuerth 2014, especially chs. 1, 6; Stang 2019, 92–4).
and such effects depend for their being on the actor — in this case the
judger or thinker.67 The thinker thus brings into existence and sustains
her thoughts by virtue of the exercise of this power for such activity.
Importantly, the judger or thinker does not depend on these various
judgments or thoughts for its own being.68 The thinker can exist
without those very thoughts, but the reverse is not true. Moreover, the
thinker brings those thoughts into existence — i.e., is their cause. The
reverse is not true. There is thus an asymmetric dependence between
thinker and thought. Moreover, the relation between thinker and
thought is a real and not merely logical relation. As Kant puts it,
“apperception is something real [Reales]” (B419; see also B418, B422n),
and in deriving the content of <substance>M from apperception,
we derive it “from an actuality” (B418). Self-conscious thinking thus
always includes a consciousness of a real asymmetric dependence
relation of thought on the thinker, whose activity brings about and
sustains the existence of the thought. Hence, in contrast to the logicist
approach discussed in the previous section, the actualist position
outlined here is well-suited to explain how representation of real
relations is possible for the thinking subject.69
67 I say more about the analogous role of apperception in grasping the content
of the category of <cause-effect> in §4.4.
68 This is, of course, compatible with a thinker depending on their thoughts
(or other modifications) for various kinds of, e.g., determinate objective cog-
nition or knowledge, or for being able to think various kinds of content. I
discuss this point in greater detail in the section concerning determinacy
below.
69 One might object here that real things can stand in merely logical relations
(e.g., life logically excludes death), so that the fact that apperception is real
does not imply that the relation between thought and thinker is real in-
stead of logical. However, this would be a mistake. Only concepts stand in
logical relations; the concept <life> excludes the concept <death>. But
the logical exclusion of the latter from the former is different from the real
(i.e., metaphysical) exclusion of (the property of) life from (the property of)
death (Kant discusses this latter form of exclusion under the topic of “real
repugnance”). In the act of thinking, one apperceives the exercise of one’s
power to bring about and sustain that very thought. This is a real and not
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While the real asymmetric dependence relation required for rep-
resenting the substanding subject of inherence is one element con-
tributed in pure apperception, there is also the subsistence relation.
We can then ask: Does pure intellectual self-consciousness provide any
awareness of the thinker as not dependent upon anything else in the
way that its thoughts are dependent on it — i.e., as not inhering in any-
thing?70 There is textual support for a positive answer to this question
in Kant’s discussion of Spinoza in the Pölitz Religion lectures.71 There
Kant says that
my own self-consciousness testifies that I do not relate all my
actions to God as the final subject which is not the predicate of
any other thing, and thus the concept of a substance arises when
I perceive in myself [indem ich an mir selbst wahrnehme] that I am
not the predicate of any further thing. For example, when I think,
I am conscious that my I, and not some other thing, thinks in me.
Thus I infer that this thinking in me does not inhere in another
thing external to me but in myself, and consequently also that
logical relation. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging clarity on
this point.
70 Note that since this consciousness is purely intellectual it counts neither as
acquaintance (Kenntnis) nor as “proper” cognition (eigentliche Erkenntnis). I
discuss this issue further below with respect to the First Paralogism.
71 That Kant believed we could be conscious of the self as subject in this sense
is also on display in his criticism of spinozism. In the Pölitz lectures on
religion from 1783/84, Kant goes so far as to say that “the concept of a
substance arises when I perceive in myself that I am not the predicate of any
other thing” (28:1042; Kant (1978), 75). Kant then argues that the spinozist is
faced with a dilemma. Since there is only one substance in which everything
inheres either I, as subject, am this substance, and therefore God — which
contradicts my dependence, or I am an accident — which contradicts my
awareness of myself as subject, as “I” (28:1052; cf. 28:1042). See (Allison
1980, 207; Wuerth 2014, 143–4 and ch. 5 passim) for relevant discussion. I
also discuss these texts further below.
I am a substance, i.e. that I exist for myself, without being the
predicate of another thing. (Pölitz Religion, 28:1042 (1783/84))72
The crucial point here is that, according to Kant’s lecture, in self-
conscious thought one is conscious that it is oneself that thinks and not
something else. In other words, one is conscious of one’s independence
or ultimacy as the ground of thinking. But then, as Kant notes, one can
immediately infer that one’s thought inheres in oneself (i.e., exhibits
the form of real dependence we conceptualize via <inherenece>)
rather than something else, and thus that one is a substantial being
(since exhibition of this kind of ultimacy just is what it is to be a sub-
stance).
Kant takes a similar line in his published work. For example, in the
First Paralogism of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
says that
in all our thinking the I is the subject, in which thoughts inhere
only as determinations, and this I cannot be used as the deter-
mination of another thing. Thus everyone must necessarily regard
Himself as a substance, but regard his thinking only as accidents of his
existence and determinations of his state. (A349; my italics)
While Kant does not go so far here as to explicitly argue for the acqui-
sition of the concept <substance>M via reflection on the content of
self-consciousness, he does endorse the anti-spinozistic point he makes
in the Pölitz lectures concerning the necessity of construing oneself
as a substance in light of the content of self-consciousness. Moreover,
Kant’s use of ‘inhere’ and his reference to acts of thought as “accidents”
indicates that he has something more than a merely grammatical con-
72 Further on in the same set of lectures, Kant also states that “[the conception
of myself as accident] contradicts my concept of my I, in which I think
myself as the ultimate subject which is not the predicate of any other thing”
(Pölitz Religion, 28:1052–3 (1783/84)).
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ception of substance in mind — viz. <substance>M.73 Thus, there is
at least some positive textual evidence in favor of ascribing to Kant the
position that in pure apperception one is conscious of a substanding
and subsisting subject.74
Aside from textual considerations, we can see why it is philosophi-
cally important for Kant’s position that it is the activity of thinking or
judging, rather than any other form of representing, such as intuiting,
that is the occasion for acquiring the content of <substance>M. This
might seem particularly pressing since all representations are such as
to inhere in substantial subjects, so why would reflection on thinking
(judging) in particular be necessary? The answer is that only in the
pure apperceptive awareness of the activity of thinking does one get
an instance of the kind of ultimacy necessary for conceiving of one-
self as not only substanding but also subsisting. To see this, consider
that intellectual acts such as judging or inferring, according to Kant,
73 Why not also (or instead) the conception of a <substance>S? As we will
see below, in §3.1, Kant’s discussion in the First Paralogism is targeted
precisely against the legitimacy of any inference from the concept of a
<substance>M to that of a <substance>S.
74 More may need to be said as to how one acquires a purely general con-
ception of substance from reflection on the activity of thinking. For it may
be that the structure of thought allows only a conception of thinking sub-
stance, and it may be necessary, in Kant’s view, for there to be other kinds
of cognitive material necessary for representation of a specifically material
substance. Kant indicates such a requirement for conceiving of matter as
substantial. Matter cannot be thought as filling space (as opposed to the ge-
ometer’s space-occupying conception) without a specific kind of experience,
which we gain via the sense of touch. Evidence for this comes in Kant’s state-
ment in the Remark to Proposition 5 of the Dynamics that the awareness of
repulsive force is acquired via the sense of touch (4:510). He also endorses
this position in the Anthropology, which explains why he says there that
touch is the “most important” of the senses (7:155) and, in the correspond-
ing lectures, says that touch is even necessary for acquiring the concept of a
(material) substance (Anthropology Friedländer (1775/6), 25:494; cf. Anthropol-
ogy Mrongovius (1784/5), 25:1242). My contention here is that representation
of substance, whether mental, material, or something else entirely, requires
that the subject represent a real and asymmetric dependence relation, and
that such a content is not present in anything but (pure) apperceptive acts
of thinking.
are acts that agents do, as opposed to those that happen to the agent
(such as sensing or intuiting).75 The intellectual acts are thus sponta-
neous rather than receptive in nature. Hence, in being the subject of a
thought (i.e., being the subject thinking the thought that p), one must
exercise a spontaneous causal power, and thereby be the ultimate cause
and explanation of the thought. Other kinds of representation, such as
sensory intuition, involve exercising a merely receptive causal power
— one which depends on something external to it — and so fail to
provide any occasion for consideration of the thinker’s ultimacy.
Thus, in thinking (judging), one is not merely conscious that a
thought occurs in one’s mind, but rather one is conscious of doing
something — viz. thinking (judging) — and thus of one’s thought as
depending on oneself for its existence and sustenance.76 Pure apper-
ception, as consciousness of one’s activity in thinking, is a conscious-
ness of precisely the real metaphysical dependence relation needed
to explain the content of <substance>M. Kant thereby not only can
eliminate other contenders for the content of <substance>M, he can
also explain why the pure apperceptive awareness of one’s intellectual
activity is its source.
One might balk at construing Kant’s thinker as a substance, but
his entire strategy in the critical period involves elucidating the cogni-
tive powers of the cognizing subject, which he construes as a substance.
Kant repeatedly, and throughout his career, characterizes a power as
a relation of a substance to its accidents and explicitly denies that the
soul, as cognizing subject, could itself be simply identified with a power,
75 For extensive defense of this point, see (McLear 2020; see also Pippin 1987;
Allison 1990; Willaschek 2006; Kohl 2015).
76 The subject of thought/agent of thought distinction has gained some promi-
nence in discussions of the phenomenon known as “thought insertion”
in contemporary psychology and philosophy of mind. The distinction is
especially championed in (Stephens and Graham 2000) and subsequently
taken up by a variety of philosophers and psychologists. See, e.g., (Radden
1998; Campbell 1999; Gallagher 2000; Coliva 2002; Bayne 2004; Kriegel 2004,
202n10; Duncan 2019).
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as, e.g., Wolff did (Metaphysik L1, 28:261; see also Metaphysik Herder,
28:25, 145; R 4762, 17:720 [1775–78]). The cognizing subject must be
understood not as a power but as a substance that has powers.77 More-
over, accidents, as Kant clearly states in the first Critique, are “determi-
nations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for
it to exist” (A186/B229), the existence of which is called “inherence, in
contrast to the existence of the substance, which is called ‘subsistence’ ”
(A187–7/B230).78
Given these points, and the obvious endorsement by Kant of the
claim that all representational content is either a priori or a posteriori,
Kant is thus in a position to conclude that pure apperception seems to
be the best (and in fact only remaining) explanation of the source for
the representational content of the concept <substance>M.
4. Objections & Replies
There are no doubt many objections to the proposed account that de-
serve discussion. I consider four below: whether my account is con-
sistent with Kant’s argument concerning <substance> in the First
Paralogism, whether it is consistent with his remarks concerning the
inexplicability of the forms of judgment, whether the content of self-
consciousness in pure apperception is sufficiently determinate to make
77 Kant comments extensively on the relation between a substance and its acci-
dents in the Herder lectures. For discussion, see (Watkins 2005, ch. 2; Wuerth
2014, ch. 5). And as Watkins (2005, ch. 6) makes clear, Kant’s conception of
substances as possessing powers continues into the critical period and is
integral to the argument of the Analogies.
78 See also R5861 18:371 (1783–4). For discussion, see (Longuenesse 1998, 331–2
and note 17); (Rosefeldt 2000, 38 and note 59)). One means of downplaying
Kant’s appeals to a cognizing subject of such accidents is to argue that the ex-
istence of cognitive powers does not, for Kant, imply the existence of a meta-
physical subject. (Kitcher 1990) presents one such argument by attempting
to contextualize Kant’s view as accepting several Humean premises, includ-
ing a “bundle view” of the self. For criticism of the plausibility of Kitcher’s
position, see (Allison 1990, ch. 4; Brook 1997; Wuerth 2006, 2014, ch. 1). For
related discussion of the issue of the justification of Kant’s claims regarding
the cognitive powers of the subject, see (Beck 1978) and especially the notion
of “short-ranged rationalist reflection” discussed in (Marshall 2014).
sense as a reply to the problem of the subject, and finally whether the
strategy for explaining the content of the category of substance can
plausibly be extended to the other categories. I take these issues in
turn.
4.1 The First Paralogism
One might object that the position I attribute to Kant violates his com-
mitment to epistemic humility, particularly concerning the nature of
the subject as a substance. Essentially, the worry is that I attribute to
Kant a position similar or identical to the position in rational psychol-
ogy against which he argues in the First Paralogism.
In the A-edition version of the Paralogism, Kant agrees that “in all
our thinking the I is subject” but asks what sort of use we are to make
of this (A349). Here he is primarily concerned with the issue of the
supposed permanence of the soul, and the extent to which we might be
able to infer from the necessity of conceiving of oneself as (in my terms)
a <substance>M to the conclusion that one is a <substance>S.
That I, as a thinking being, endure for myself, that naturally I
neither arise nor perish — this I can by no means infer, and yet
it is for that alone that the concept of the substantiality of my
thinking subject can be useful to me; without that I could very
well dispense with it altogether. (A349)
Kant’s primary aim here is not to argue against the position that
the soul is substantial, but rather to argue against the epistemic fe-
cundity of an argument from the first-person-derived concept of a
<substance>M to a conclusion about the permanence of such a subject
or substance.79 This is especially clear given Kant’s insistence, immedi-
ately prior to the quote given just above, that
79 For a similar reading, see (Van Cleve 1999, 173). Karl Ameriks (2000a, 67)
argues that the A-edition First Paralogism fails to provide any non-spurious
argument against the status of soul as a noumenal substance. I agree with
Ameriks that Kant does not argue against the status of the soul as a sub-
stance, but deny that he ever intends to do so. His main aim concerns the
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everyone must necessarily regard Himself as a substance, but
regard his thinking only as accidents of his existence and deter-
minations of his state. (A349)
Here one might object that such an interpretation attributes to Kant a
position he would have deemed “unacceptably dogmatic”, insofar as it
would seem to allow that the paralogistic argument Kant articulates is
in fact successful in establishing that we are metaphysical substances.80
Indeed, in allowing that we have consciousness of ourselves as meta-
physical subjects one might think the interpretation contravenes Kant’s
statement that
the first syllogism of transcendental psychology imposes on us
an only allegedly new insight when it passes off the constant
logical subject of thinking as the cognition of a real subject of
inherence, with which we do not and cannot have the least ac-
quaintance [Kenntnis]. (A350)
The crux of the objection hinges on Kant’s denial that we have any
“acquaintance” (Kenntnis) with a real subject of inherence. Does this
threaten the interpretation I’ve offered?
No, it does not. Kant’s use of ‘acquaintance’ is important here be-
cause the term is a technical one, denoting presentation to conscious-
ness in intuition.81 So we “cannot have the least acquaintance” with a
substantial subject in the sense that we can have no sensible intuition
of it. And since we have no sensible intuition, we have no basis for
claiming that there is a permanent subject of all thought. But this is all
compatible with construing the content of <substance>M as deriving
claim that we could have knowledge of the permanence of the soul, which he
consistently denies. For a similar position see (Wuerth 2014, 166–7).
80 For such an objection, see (Proops 2010, 462ff).
81 Kant regularly uses the term in this manner in the logic lectures. See, e.g.,
the various “ladder of cognition” passages at Jäsche Logik (1800) § X, 9:64–5;
Dohna-Wundlacken Logik (c. 1792) 24:730–1; Wiener Logik (1780) 24:846; Logik
Blomberg (c. 1771) 24:132–3, 134–5, 136)
from pure apperception, for that content is not intuitive — i.e., tempo-
ral or spatial — in character.
Moreover, in claiming that the content of <substance>M comes
from pure apperception, I make no claim that Kant construes pure ap-
perception as providing either cognition or knowledge of ourselves as
such subjects. Kant can reasonably hold the former position — that
we are conscious of ourselves as being a particular way in pure ap-
perception — without risk of dogmatism, and thus without thereby
endorsing the latter position — that we have cognition or knowledge
of ourselves as permanent beings. And this is exactly what I take him
to be doing in the A-edition version of the First Paralogism.
In any case, even if the above defense works for the first edition of
the Paralogisms, one might object that, looking at the B-edition, this
defense is not cogent. For, in the second edition of the Paralogisms,
Kant appears to explicitly deny that pure apperception reveals any-
thing about the subject.
Thinking, taken in itself [für sich], is merely the logical function
and hence the sheer spontaneity of combining the manifold of
a merely possible intuition; and in no way does it present the
subject of consciousness as appearance ... In this way [i.e., in
thinking] I represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I
appear to myself, but rather I think myself only as I do every
object in general from whose kind of intuition I abstract. If here
I represent myself as subject of a thought or even as ground
of thinking, then these ways of representing do not signify the
categories of substance or cause, for these categories are those
functions of thinking (of judging) applied to our sensible intu-
ition, which would obviously be demanded if I wanted to cog-
nize myself. (B428–9)
Kant here denies that pure apperception presents any sort of sensory
or intellectual appearance, but he also might seem to deny that pure
apperception presents anything as subject or ground, in the metaphys-
philosophers’ imprint - 27 - vol. 20, no. 26 (september 2020)
colin mclear Apperception and the Substantial Subject
ical sense with which the category is concerned. However, there are
three points of note that should help mitigate this problem.
First, Kant is, as the last clause of the passage indicates, focused
on the issue of cognition, so his rhetoric is directed against the posi-
tion that we have cognition of the subject as permanent (via applica-
tion of the category of substance). That one falls short of cognition of
what is presented in intellectual self-consciousness is compatible with
there being something of which one is aware in the having of such
self-consciousness.82 In this way Kant’s position is exactly the same as
was stated in the A-edition of the First Paralogism.
Second, and reinforcing the concern with cognition, Kant goes on
to say that “in the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the
being itself” (B429; emphasis in original), which indicates that though
I have no cognition of myself (that would require intuition), I neverthe-
less am conscious of myself as the subject of my thoughts — as being
the being itself who is thinking this very thought.83
Finally, in pure apperception, I am aware of my thoughts as mine.
This goes beyond any merely logical or grammatical claim, as might be
granted merely to the form of categorical judgment or the unschema-
tized category of substance. The awareness of a thought as mine is
not merely the awareness of a grammatical subject of predication. It
is an awareness of me, and specifically, of myself as thinker — the “be-
ing itself”, as Kant says. Kant allows that we have such awareness of
ourselves as thinkers (indeed he argues for this) in the B-Deduction.
He does not renounce this position in either edition of the First Paral-
ogism (or in the Paralogisms more generally), and nothing he argues
there goes against it. If this is correct, it does mean that Kant’s argu-
82 In the Refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof, Kant says that in pure appercep-
tion we “begin not from the concept of a thinking being in general but from
an actuality” (B418) and that “apperception is something real [Reales]” (B419;
cf. B422n). This seems to indicate a real and not merely logical content to
pure apperception.
83 For a similar point, see Ameriks’ reply to Klemme (Ameriks 2000b, xxiii–
xxix) and especially note 46; cf. (Wuerth 2014, 167–8).
ment in the Paralogisms is perhaps more limited than some have taken
it to be. But it doesn’t mean ascribing to him either the kind of posi-
tion in rational psychology that he criticizes or is limiting himself to a
wholly austere position regarding the self as subject.
A further objection, raised by Karl Ameriks, is that the claim that
the “I” is “absolute” in the metaphysical sense here at issue does not ac-
tually prove what is needed concerning the substantiality of the think-
ing subject.
The representation ‘I’ is absolute here in that there is no proper
way of representing these thoughts which leaves no room for
the phrase ‘I think’. Yet this does not mean that I am truly the
absolute subject of my thoughts as a substantial mental being ...
as long as it is metaphysically possible ... that what I take to be a
substantial soul is ultimately a set of (individually) non-mental
beings ... In such a case I (as the thinking personality that I take
myself to be) would really be an accident or resultant of those
beings, and so but a prima-facie or relative and not absolute
subject, and yet the representation ‘I’ would retain its ultimacy
[in the sense at issue].84
Ameriks (2000a, 70) takes Kant to simply ignore this possibility in the
A-edition Paralogisms, only to then take it up in the B-edition, where
he provides an argument against the “mere assertion” of the substan-
tiality of the soul at B410–12. Ameriks puts his challenge here in terms
of realization by multiple substances, but the issue could just as well
be pressed by appeal to a single substance (such as God) of which we
are all accidents. The challenge is also suggested by the fact that Kant
goes on to claim that “it is not determined whether I could exist and
be thought of only as subject and not as predicate of another thing”
(B419).85
84 (Ameriks 2000a, 69–70).
85 See (Wuerth 2014, 169) for an alternative way of addressing this problem by
means of an appeal to Kant’s “Virgil argument”.
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However, all that these passages show is that Kant denies that we
can cognize or otherwise come to know our subsistence as ultimate sub-
jects. Kant’s arguments do not show that we do not at the least repre-
sent ourselves as subsisting and substanding beings. Indeed, he seems
to think that we have to represent ourselves as substances based on the
content of self-conscious thinking. Moreover, the considerations that
Kant (and Ameriks) raises do not even show that it is unwarranted
to believe that the self is substantial, especially if we have to think in
this way. The arguments are thus perfectly compatible with the central
interpretive claim that I advance — viz. that it is in pure apperception,
and nowhere else, that we come to be able to represent a metaphysi-
cal subject. Perhaps pure apperception is provisioning us with a mis-
representation. Sufficient theoretical grounds could never be given to
warrant knowledge of the truth of it or its opposite.86
4.2 Is There No Explanation of the Categories?
The second worry is that, by construing Kant as explaining the source
of the content of the category of substance as grounded in pure apper-
ception, my interpretation goes against his statement that we cannot
explain why we have the categories that we do rather than some other
set (B145–6).
Here is Kant’s statement, in §21 of the B-Deduction, regarding the
unexplained nature of the forms of judgment and the categories:87
86 For defense of the claim concerning belief in one’s substantiality and causal
ultimacy, see (Pereboom 2006; McLear 2020). For one sketch of how a kan-
tian metaphysics of the self could be fleshed out in terms of something other
than a single substance, see (Marshall 2010, sec. 4). Moreover, there may well
be practical grounds on which Kant thinks we could have cognition of the
self as substance, particularly in terms of its freedom, activity, and moral
status. For discussion, see (Schafer, n.d.a, n.d.b).
87 This worry forms a central plank in Lorenz Krüger’s (1968) objection to
Klaus Reich’s (1992) attempt to derive the forms of judgment from apper-
ception. While I address aspects of Krüger’s argument below, here I want
to note merely that my interpretation is not aimed at any derivation of the
forms of judgment from apperception (though I think the strategy I employ
could also be used to defend against that type of objection). The issue, rather,
This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can bring about a
priori unity of apperception [Einheit der Apperception a priori zu
Stande zu bringen] solely by means of the categories, and only by
such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as
why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or
why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition.
(B145–6)
This passage may seem to raise two problems. First, Kant might be
taken as claiming here that the understanding produces unity of ap-
perception by means of all the categories (including <substance>),88
and second, that the categorical forms by which the understanding
does so are given a priori as explanatorily irreducible or primitive ac-
tivities. Accordingly, while apperception is related to all the categories,
the relation is not obviously the one indicated by my interpretation.
For on the one hand there is no talk in B145–6 of deriving the concept
of substance from apperception, and on the other there is no appeal
to apperception (or anything else) to explain why we have “just these
and no other” functions of judgment. Let me take two points in turn.
Concerning the production of the unity of apperception (solely) by
means of the categories, it is important to keep in mind two things.
First, Kant conceives of the original synthetic unity of apperception
(§16) as the “highest point” of cognition (B134n), as that “on which
even the possibility of the understanding rests” (B137), and as the
“ground of the possibility of the categories” (A401). If the possibility
of the understanding, as the faculty for generating concepts, rests on
this original unity of apperception, then the unity of apperception can-
is how a category possessing content distinct from that of the relevant form
of judgment is supposed to have gotten that content.
88 For one contemporary version of this interpretation see Kitcher (2011, 2014),
who construes apperception as constituted by the activity of making content-
based transitions — and so fundamentally categorial transitions — between
representations. For example, she says, “[W]hat he means by ‘apperception’
is not being conscious of a self, but recognizing (by having produced) nec-
essary connections across mental states” (Kitcher 2014, 153).
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not be produced by concepts generated by the understanding. Second,
Kant’s claim at B145–6 that the unity of apperception is brought about
“by means of the categories” is specifically concerned with the “objec-
tive” unity of apperception, whereby “all of the manifold given in an in-
tuition is united in a concept of the object” (B139). Kant’s point here is
that this objective unity is, in finite subjects, discursive in being brought
about through concepts, and is not the result of some non-discursive
intellectual intuition. Thus talk of the objective unity of consciousness
requires an a priori objective unity brought about through the cate-
gories. But this does not entail either that the categories bring about
unity of apperception as such or that they make possible the power
to produce such unity. Hence Kant’s discussion of the unity brought
about by the categories is perfectly compatible with my proposed in-
terpretation.
Concerning the central explanatory worry, my proposed inter-
pretation only aims to give an account of how the content consti-
tuting <substance>M might be derived from the content of pure
self-consciousness. The account does not aim to explain why self-
consciousness grounds only this kind of content as opposed to other
such content — i.e., why it is that pure self-consciousness presents a
real asymmetric dependence relation in thought and not some other
kind of relation altogether. Accomplishing this latter claim would re-
quire knowing more about the metaphysical nature of the subject, how
and why it was created, etc. To be sure, my account provides an expla-
nation of why the content of the concept <substance>M is what it
is, but it doesn’t explain why this content is this way and no other way,
for it cannot explain why our self-consciousness takes the form that
it does and not some other (e.g., intellectually intuitive) form. Hence,
relating the concept <substance>M to pure apperception does not
violate Kant’s explanatory humility as expressed in B145–6.
4.3 Indeterminacy
A third objection concerns the status, in pure apperception, of the “in-
determinate consciousness” of oneself as subject. As I’ve argued above,
this consciousness is not something that is or could ever rise to the level
of cognition or knowledge. How then could a mental state that counts
as neither cognition nor knowledge provide anything of sufficiently de-
terminate content that it could resolve the problem of the subject I’ve
outlined here? Even worse, if the consciousness of the “I” as subject is
bereft of all qualities, as it must be if the apperception is “pure” in the
sense with which Kant is concerned, how is it that one is aware of any
feature of the self at all?
In reply to the first question, a central plank of Kant’s critical philos-
ophy is the claim that transcendental freedom is a condition of moral
responsibility. According to Kant, the idea of such freedom, though
wholly non-empirical, is sufficiently determinate to play this founda-
tional role even though we can never have theoretical cognition or
knowledge of its instantiation. Assuming that Kant’s position here is
coherent, there does not seem to be a further obstacle to saying that
there are other cases of representation that do not lead to cognition
or knowledge, but that have determinate content, and if my argument
above is cogent, intellectual self-consciousness of one’s substantial na-
ture provides one such case.
Concerning the second question, we should distinguish between
two different senses in which consciousness might have “content”.
There is the sense that Kant normally attaches to ‘Inhalt’ as the deter-
minate content of some object to which one is related.89 This objective
awareness of oneself is dependent on (or “determined” by) some em-
pirical intuition. This means that one is not aware of any feature of the
self other than that it appears in such and such ways (e.g., as upset,
hungry, believing that it will rain, etc.).90 In this sense, pure intellec-
89 For a discussion of ‘Inhalt’ as being a kind of relation to an object, see (Tolley
2014, sec. 5).
90 For a similar position, see (Wuerth 2014, 144–5).
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tual self-consciousness is wholly without content — it does not offer
any objective content for determining oneself in any way. Nevertheless,
for all Kant says concerning the “emptiness” of pure apperception, it is
wholly compatible with his position that there is a kind of “subjective
content” to pure apperception. This would include one’s awareness, as
Kant says, that “I am the being itself” that is thinking, which is to say
that in thinking I am aware of my existence, and of the acts of think-
ing in which I, as so existing, engage.91 This awareness says nothing
concerning what kind of being one is (e.g., material or immaterial), or
any other determinate feature that one might possess. Thus, agreeing
that in pure apperception there is no determinate representation of an
object does not thereby require conceding that there is nothing at all to
be gleaned from pure self-consciousness.
4.4 The Other Categories
One might object to my proposal on the basis that the explanation
of the derivation of <substance> from apperception is too ad hoc
— i.e., it applies only to this particular concept and not to the other
categories. If this charge were cogent, it would present a problem for
the overall “actualist” approach I’ve advocated, since, for example, the
logicist interpretation has at least the appearance of offering a systematic
outline concerning the connection between the content of each category
and its related form of judgment.
Giving an account, even in outline, of how each of the twelve cate-
gories derives content from apperception is obviously a large task, too
large to accomplish here. Instead I want to discuss some features of the
actualist strategy for connecting apperception and categorial content,
91 Houston Smit (1999, 207–8) defends a similar point in arguing that the self-
consciousness by which the categories are acquired as reflected representa-
tions is not itself consciousness of an object, and thus not a determinate form
of consciousness that requires an intuition for its content, though of course
it requires intuition as an enabling condition (in the sense that all cognition
“begins with experience” (B1)). This is not to say that Smit would thereby
endorse any of the further claims I have made here.
as well as how a derivation of at least some of the other categories
would go. This won’t be enough to fully answer skeptical worries con-
cerning the connection between apperception and the categories, but
it should be enough to rebut the ad hoc charge.
The general strategy for deriving each category is that of finding
some discrepancy between the pure logical form and the schematized
category, with the explanation being that the content or structure of
some actual intellectually self-conscious activity supplies the missing
content. In each case, the content will concern some real asymmetry,
dependence, or existence that cannot be represented purely via appeal
to logical form, and which is presupposed by the schematized version
of the category.
Other than <substance>, the above features are perhaps most eas-
ily seen in the other categories of relation. Indeed, in my explanation
of the dependence of a thought on its thinker, I appeal to the way
in which the thinker brings about or causes the thought to occur. The
thought both inheres in and is caused by the thinker. The fact that
these two categories relate so closely is part of Kant’s view, discussed
above, that “causality leads to the concept of action, this to the concept
of force, and thereby to the concept of substance” (A204/B249; see
also A205/B250; R5289–90 (1776/78?) 18:144; R5650 (1785–88) 18:298–
302). Indeed, Kant seems to think appeal to causation is a necessary
part of understanding the occurrence of inhering accidents, as when
he is described as saying that an act is the determination of sub-
stance as the cause of an accident (Metaphysik Pölitz (1790/1) 28:564–
5).92 The category of community is derived from the dependence of
pure self-consciousness on interaction (whether in itself or another)
for any objectual (i.e., intuitive) content. There is a dependence of self-
consciousness on content, and of the content (as content) on this self-
consciousness. As Kant puts it in describing the logical form of the
concept, “the members of the division exclude each other and yet are
92 For a similar appeal to the interconnection of <substance> and <cause>,
see (Schulting 2012, 144–5).
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connected in one sphere” (B113). Self-consciousness and its content are
distinct from and yet depend on one another. They are disparate states
connected in one subject, and more broadly, in one experience.
Another category that also relatively straightforwardly connects to
pure apperception is actuality, or existence (Kant often uses these terms
interchangeably).93 Existence is derivable simply from the fact of self-
consciousness. As we’ve seen, Kant claims that in pure apperception
“I am the being itself” that is self-conscious (B429). Kant also expresses
this fact in his (admittedly somewhat tortured) explanation of the re-
lation between “I think” and “I exist” in the important footnote at
B422-3 in the B-Paralogisms. Kant there describes “I think” as always
connected, in its expression, to some empirical intuition, “which pro-
vides the material for thinking, [and without which] the act I think
would not take place” (B423n). But the existence that is expressed in
the “I think”
precedes the experience that is to determine the object of percep-
tion through the category in regard to time; and here existence
is not yet a category. (B423n)
While it is admittedly obscure as to what Kant can mean in talking
of a representation of existence that is “not yet a category” one thing
he might be aiming to express is the idea that pure self-consciousness
provides the basis for representing an existence, though not yet as de-
terminate, and specifically, as determinate in time. One needs to move
from the actuality of a being, to — via the content of the universal
schema of time, and the determinate content of some particular em-
pirical intuition — the actuality of some temporally determinate being.
This point is compatible with his conception of the “I think” as ex-
pressing an empirical proposition insofar as the application or use of
93 In the Postulates the second modal category is now the category of “actu-
ality” (Wirklichkeit) (A218/B266). Kant also explicates the schematized con-
cept <actuality> in terms of “existence [Dasein] at a determinate time”
(A145/B184)
the intellectual faculty depends on intuition, while also emphasizing
that intellectual self-consciousness provides the basis for representing
existence itself.
Much more needs to be said to fully substantiate the connection
of each category with pure apperception. But the charge that the ac-
tualist strategy is ad hoc is not warranted, since there is at least some
justification for thinking that other categories can be (and in fact are)
so derived.
5. Conclusion
We have seen that Kant must provide an account of the source of the
content of our representation of the real relation of asymmetric de-
pendence necessary for representing anything as a subsisting and sub-
standing being. This content constitutes what I have called the concept
<substance>M. Given Kant’s denial that intuition could present such
content, he lacks any empirical explanation for the knowledge that
we seemingly do possess concerning a world of substantial bodies in
physical interaction, and the empirical subjects who cognize them.
According to the “actualist” interpretation for which I’ve argued,
there is no possible source of content for <substance>M other than
the pure apperception of the actuality of the thinking subject and its
activity. I contend that Kant explains the nature of this content by
appealing to the self-conscious activity of the thinking being, which
presupposes consciousness of the dependence of the thought on its
owner, and thus a grasp of the basic relationship between a subject
and its “accidents” or properties necessary for understanding anything
as a substance. Such self-consciousness cannot provide knowledge of
what the subject really is — i.e., what it is “in itself.” Indeed, we can-
not know or cognize whether the content of a purely intellectual self-
consciousness accurately describes the reality of our own existence as
ultimate subjects. Thus nothing about the position I’ve ascribed to Kant
on this matter violates his overarching epistemic humility. But, insofar
as <substance>M is a category necessary for scientific knowledge of
objects, this I-as-metaphysical-subject model is a necessary condition
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for achieving such knowledge.94 And while Kant seems to leave it as
an exercise for the reader how exactly this I-as-metaphysical-subject
stands as the model for the content of <substance> or the other cat-
egories, I hope to have shown that Kant’s strategy here is both intelli-
gible and at least prima facie coherent.
In sum, according to the position I take Kant to hold, we lack both
the intuition of a substance, and any such innate representation of it.
There is only one possible way to explain the grasp we have of the
representational content of <substance>M. This, according to Kant,
is via the purely intellectual self-consciousness that necessarily is able
to accompany any act of thinking, and which includes an intellectual
consciousness of the thinker’s mental states as belonging to, originat-
ing from, and thereby depending on it — whatever else it is. In such a
way the thinker is provided with the content necessary for represent-
ing the ultimacy and real asymmetric dependence relations of things
exemplifying the category <substance>. Kant thereby offers a quali-
fied endorsement of the Difference Thesis and the concomitant Source
and Priority Theses discussed in section two. In this limited sense then,
for Kant, the “I” remains the original of all objects.95
94 If my understanding of Kant is correct, this places his position regarding the
importance of self-consciousness in connection to the categories much closer
to that of Jena-period Fichte and the early Schelling than one might other-
wise expect. I have in mind here particularly Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre as he
presented it between 1794 and 1797 (see (Fichte 1982)) and Schelling’s ideal-
ism in its early Fichtean phase (see especially “Of the I as Principle of Phi-
losophy”, as well as the other papers collected and translated in (Schelling
1980)). For a similar point regarding the relation between Kant and Fichte’s
views on self-consciousness, see (Neuhouser 1990, 78). Whether this con-
nection between Kant and post-kantian German Idealism is a good or bad
making feature of the interpretation depends more generally on whether
one thinks of the post-Kantian German Idealists as close readers of Kant or
as, in one way or another, misreading or otherwise departing from him. I
intend to discuss these issues further in future work.
95 This paper has received useful input from a variety of sources. Thanks to
audiences at McGill, the University of Toronto, and the University of North
Carolina for helpful questions and discussion. Special thanks to G. Anthony
Bruno, Yoon Choi, Dai Heide, Colin Marshall, James Messina, and Tyke
Translations & Abbreviations
Quotations from Kant’s work are from the Akademie Ausgabe, with the
First Critique cited by the standard A/B edition pagination, and the
other works by volume and page. Where available, translations gener-
ally follow The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, general
editors Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. References to other primary texts
follow available English translations where possible. References to spe-
cific Cambridge translations of Kant are abbreviated as follows:
• An: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
• C: Correspondence
• CPJ: Critique of the Power of Judgment
• CPR: Critique of Pure Reason
• CPrR: Critique of Practical Reason
• G: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
• ID: On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World
• JL: Jäsche Logic
• LM: Lectures on Metaphysics
• MM: Metaphysics of Morals
• NE: A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition
• OPA: The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the
Existence of God
• Pr: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
• Refl: Notes and Fragments
• Rel: Religion within the Boundaries of Reason Alone
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